Resistance on the Internet: A study of the Singapore Case by TAN SUQIN, TRACY
 
 
RESISTANCE ON THE INTERNET:  








TAN SUQIN, TRACY 












A THESIS SUBMITTED  
 
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 
 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 








I am immensely grateful to my supervisor, Dr. Kenneth Paul A. Tan Sze-Sian, who has 
been most patient and understanding with me, and having guided me through this 
academic journey with his constant words of encouragement and advice. He has 
frequently stopped to offer directions whenever I felt lost during the course of exploring 
the somewhat harsh terrain, but has never once dictated my final destination. I have the 
greatest respect for him as a mentor, an educator, and a sharp, dynamic and humorous 
individual, who, despite his brilliance and various achievements, is ever so humble and 
approachable. 
 
I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to Dr. Kyaw Yin Hlaing for having sparked 
my interest in comparative politics, and for reintroducing me to the works of James C. 
Scott, which eventually inspired this dissertation. I am also grateful to Dr. Ethan 
Putterman who provided useful suggestions to my thesis at its early stages; Dr. Wang 
Cheng-Lung, who somehow made statistics easier to comprehend; as well as Prof. 
Bilveer Singh, Dr. Kripa Sridharan and Dr. Alan Chong, who all have contributed to my 
keen interest in Political Science through their teachings in my earlier years at NUS.  I 
also owe my gratitude to Ms. Zauwiyah Majid, Mdm. Stephanie Teo, Mrs. Jamuna 
Maniam, Ms. Mumtaj d/o Haniffa, Ms. Vijayalakshmi Rehunathan and Mr Sani Bin 
Sidol, for being so helpful in handling all the administrative details of my academic life 
here in NUS. 
 
I am also deeply indebted to Chia Hui Ping, who has been a constant source of 
inspiration and encouragement since our undergraduate days. The past years would have 
 ii 
been much less interesting and fun-filled without her companionship, which included 
many intellectual (and perhaps more often than not, frivolous) discussions.  I would like 
to take the opportunity to wish her all the best in her dissertation, and to express my 
utmost gratitude for taking time out her busy schedule to proofread my thesis. Thanks to 
U. K. Shyam who has helped me proofread parts of the dissertation as well. 
 
My heartfelt appreciation goes to Andy Mickey Choong who has been extremely helpful 
and supportive the past two years. Thanks for introducing me to diving, as well as 
offering to proofread the thesis.  
 
I would also like to thank Seah Bee Leng for sacrificing her precious time to proofread 
parts of my thesis, and above all, having been extremely generous with helping me in the 
course of my university life. I have so much to learn from her, especially her energy, 
perseverance and quest for perfection in whatever she does. 
 
I am utmost grateful to Mum and Dad for their unconditional love; for having always 
believed in me, as well as providing me the opportunity and freedom to pursue my 
chosen path. Thanks to Justin and Jasmine for being such wonderful siblings I can 
always count on and for having helped me in their own ways. 
 
Last but not least, I would like to thank Jacob Palm for being an unwavering pillar of 
support, despite being half the world apart from me the past two years. I deeply 
appreciate his constant words of encouragement and support, especially when the going 
got tough.  
 
 iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Acknowledgements  i 
   
Table of Contents  iii 
   
Summary  v 
   
Introduction Literature Review 1 
     Civil society and the Internet  in Singapore 3 
     (Auto-)regulation on the Internet 7 
      Internet Political Discourse in the Region 10 
 The Significance of the Study and the Importance of the  
     Singaporean Case 
14 
   
Chapter 1 ‘Everyday forms of resistance’ on the Internet 18 
 Analytical Framework 18 
 Strategies of Resistance: Anonymity, Gossip/Rumour, 
Satire/Parody and “Rightful Resistance” 
28 
 Methodology 35 
 An Overview of the Chapters 37 
 Limitations 37 
   
Chapter 2 Mission Impossible: Regulating Cyberspace 39 
 The Dominance of the PAP 39 
 OB Markers 44 
 Cyberspace: An Alternative Space 47 
 Policing Cyberspace 49 
 Elections and the Internet: “New Media, Same Rules” 55 
   
   
Chapter 3 “Alternative” Websites 58 
 Singapore Political Elections 58 
 Talkingcock.com: Not just “Talking Cock” 61 
 The Reincarnation of Sintercom 70 
 Think Centre: Online Activism 74 
 Alternative Websites as Sites of Resistance 77 
   
Chapter 4 Online Forums: Virtual Coffee Shops 79 
 sgForums: The Online “Speakers’ Corner” 80 
 Sammyboy: The Online “Alfresco Coffee Shop” 81 
 soc.culture.singapore: The Alternative Newsgroup  81 
 Major Issues of Contention During the Election Season 82 
 Online Forums as Sites of Resistance 85 
     The Network of Forums, Blogs and Other Cyberspace Entities 85 
     Countering Unfair Media Coverage 87 
     Gossip and Rumour 89 
     Anonymity 91 
 iv 
   
Chapter 5 The Emergence of Blogs 94 
 Covering the 2006 Elections 97 
 Blogs as Sites of Resistance 98 
     Exploiting Technical Ambiguities 98 
     Nicknaming/Character Assassination  100 
     Rightful Resistance 100 
     Humour, Satire and Parody 103 
     Alternative Media/Citizen Journalism 106 
 Rational Cyberspace: an Oxymoron? 110 
 Offline vs. Online World 112 
   
Conclusion  115 
   



































 This thesis employs Antonio Gramsci's framework of hegemony to the context of 
Singapore politics to understand the dynamics of political resistance in Singapore. As 
scholars have largely focused on the issues of self-regulation, self-censorship and the 
use of the Internet by civil society in the Singapore context, this dissertation seeks to 
examine the scope for the struggle for hegemony on the Internet.  
In attempting to analyse these various forms of resistance, this study employs 
textual analysis in the examination of the various cyberspace entities, “alternative” 
websites, forums and blogs, focusing on the online activities surrounding the 2006 
Singapore General Elections, the various reactions by netizens and counter-reactions 
from the government offline. This study thus argues that the citizens in Singapore 
who are constrained by legal implications of open protests and confrontation exploit 
the use of the Internet—a realm that is impossible to control fully—to constantly 
negotiate the subtle disciplining mechanisms of the state, drawing from their arsenal 
various strategies of resistance: the veil of anonymity, gossip, rumour, the disguise of 
humour in satire/parody and “rightful resistance”; thereby offering counter-hegemonic 
readings, alternative discourses and dissenting opinions in various ways that 
circumvent existing laws and regulations.  
James C. Scott's theoretical framework supplements the Gramscian framework 
in that the former refers to a third realm of politics that lies strategically between the 
"public" and "hidden" transcript—the politics of disguise and anonymity that  takes 
place in public view but is designed to have a double meaning or to shield the identity 
of actors.  
 vi 
 
 This study thus demonstrates the cyber terrain of resistance as a site of 
struggle for hegemony, illustrating how the state tries to win the battleground by 
imposing regulatory structures to counter resistance, among other means, in 
attempting to control the “public transcript”, while netizens try to resist by pushing 
the boundaries of the strategic realm between the "public" and “hidden transcript” on 
the Internet. In this complex process that invokes Gramsci’s notion of the “war of 
position”, both the state and netizens concede some pockets of space while trying to 
win others. 
 This thesis subsequently suggests that the “Singapore-model” of regulatory 
structures is not as solid as what the existing literature has suggested insofar as the 
















The advent of the Internet has spurred scholars to examine how this technology helps 
to create new forms of community, empowering citizens and challenging existing 
power structures; yet, the same technology has been argued to reinforce these very 
same power structures. In the Singapore context, discourse on the political and social 
impact of the Internet has been clustered around two focal points: the use of the 
Internet by civil society organisations and regulatory structures on the Internet which 
limits the political impact of the medium. This thesis thus seeks to elucidate the 
significance of the Internet as a tool and platform for resistance in Singapore, which 
has not been adequately explored. 
 
Literature Review  
Internet technology is perceived as allowing for the carving out of an alternate public 
sphere that eases communication, deliberation and organisation. Studies conducted in 
this area have focused on the technical ability of the Internet to reduce the costs of 
organisation via surmounting the need for physical meeting spaces1 and by reducing 
time costs through asynchronous communication.2 Other studies have identified 
specific functions and capacities of the Internet: websites function as information 
providers and information clearinghouses,3 and the Internet has aided social and 
political mobilisation as evident by the presence of online protests and online drives.4  
                                                
1 See Jeffrey M. Ayres, “From the Streets to the Internet: The Cyber-Diffusion of Contention”, Annals, 
AAPSS 566 (1999): 137 and Hans K. Klein, “Tocqueville in Cyberspace: Using the Internet for Citizen 
Associations”, The Information Society 15 (1999): 218. 
2 Klein, 218. 
3 Ayres, 137. 
4 Roger Hurwitz, “Who Needs Politics? Who Needs People? The Ironies of Democracy in 
Cyberspace”, Contemporary Sociology 28 (6) (1999): 660.  
 2 
Online forums also serve as a space for discussion and re-education of citizens about 
participation in public affairs.5  
 Tambini specifies four functions of the capabilities of the Internet: information 
provision, preferences measurement (through e-surveys and expression of opinions in 
forums), deliberation (through online forums) and will-formation (through online 
protests and online drives).6 Ultimately, according to Hill and Hughes, “one of the 
truly revolutionary aspects of the Internet is that everyone is a potential broadcaster 
and participant in the realm of political communication”.7 
 Studies have also examined the limitations of the functions and capacities of 
the Internet. For example, Hurwitz opines that online discussions lose focus or 
quickly break down,8 and Klein and Levine argue that the reach of the Internet is 
dependent on the informational and organisational capacities of the Internet, while the 
issues of cost and literacy sustain a digital divide that may not be bridged in the short 
to mid-term.9 Other problems highlighted include thin social bonds that are developed 
online (as opposed to stronger bonds developed offline) and irresponsible, anti-social 
behaviour and mistrust due to anonymity on the Net.10 With regards to the creation of 
social capital, Uslaner opines that in the context of declining civic engagement in the 
United States, the Internet will hardly help to create new communities and that 
Internet use neither consumes nor produces trust.11 Dahlgren furthers this opinion by 
                                                
5 Klein, 214. 
6 Damian. Tambini, “New Media and Democracy: The Civic Networking Movement” New Media and 
Society 1 (3) (1999): 306. 
7 Kevin A. Hill and John E. Hughes, Cyberpolitics: Citizen Activism in the Age of the Internet 
(Lanham, Maryland.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 23. Emphasis in original. 
8 Hurwitz, 658. 
9 Klein, “Tocqueville in Cyberspace”, 219 and Peter Levine, “The Internet and Civil Society” in Verna 
V. Gehring (ed) The Internet in Public Life (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004): 79-82. 
10 Peter Levine, 82-84 and Eric M. Uslaner, “Social Capital and the Net”, in Verna V. Gehring (ed) The 
Internet in Public Life (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004): 101-109. 
11 Uslaner, 108. 
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stating that though the Internet may offer opportunities for engagement in public 
space, it is questionable to assume that this will have significant impact on overall 
patterns of political engagement.12  
 Thus it can be argued that the above mentioned issues are threefold as Resnick 
distinguishes that there are politics within the Net (that concerns the internal operation 
of the Internet), politics which impacts the Net (that concerns government attempts to 
regulate cyberspace) and political uses of the net (that concerns the use of Web sites 
to affect politics offline). This distinction helps Resnick advance his “normalization 
thesis”—the argument that politics offline has flooded cyberspace and shaped new 
uses in its image.13 
 
Civil Society and the Internet in Singapore 
Many scholars have examined the relationship between the Internet and the growth of 
civil society in Singapore. The arrival and commercialisation of Internet discussion 
forums, newsgroups, chat rooms and websites both local and overseas in the mid-
1990s have accompanied a rise in civil society engagement.14 Initiatives such as The 
Working Committee (TWC), Think Centre (TC) and Fateha have increased discourse 
on issues like civil society development, human rights and Muslim rights advocacy 
respectively. Newsgroups and alternative websites like the Singapore Review, New 
Sintercom, Little Speck and The Void Deck do likewise by distributing a wide variety 
of content, most of which deviate from government-controlled mediaspeak.  
                                                
12 Peter Dahlgren, “The Public Sphere and the Net: Structure, Space, and Communication” in W. L. 
Bennett and R. M. Entman (eds.) Mediated Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001): 
51. 
13 David Resnick, “Politics on the Internet: The Normalization of Cyberspace” in Chris Toulouse and 
Timothy W. Luke (eds.) The Politics of Cyberspace (New York: Routledge, 1998): 48- 68. 
14 James Gomez, “Reviewing Singapore Civil Society”, 12 May 2004, 
<http://www.jamesgomeznews.com/article.php?AID=94&Page=1> (10 June 2004). 
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 These changes have prompted Alvin Tan, founder and artistic director of The 
Necessary Stage (TNS), to remark that he used to think Singaporeans were not 
political, “but people are becoming politicized online” and that one can “see it in the 
on-line interactions, the growing sophistication of the citizenry”.15 As such, some 
argue that the growth of Internet technology in Singapore has opened up new spaces 
and possibilities for activism, alternate community building and even resistance.16 
 The Internet has been argued to have benefited civil society organisations as it 
is a relatively cost effective, efficient and convenient administrative tool for 
communication and information dissemination.17 The Internet also serves as a 
platform for like-minded individuals to get together to share information and 
experiences, provide mutual support, thus facilitating social group formation within 
civil society. Such groups can launch homepages that serve as newsletters, and 
premises “with a shopfront, reception area, informational counter, resource centre and 
                                                
15 Gordon Fairclough, “A World of Their Own” Far Eastern Economic Review 167(43) (28 October 
2004): 61. 
16 S. S. S. Koh, The Real in the Virtual: Cyberculture on Internet Relay Chat, Singapore: National 
University of Singapore, Department of Sociology, 1998 (unpublished, Honours Thesis) and Y. W. 
Neo, Discipline and Reward: Cyberspaces in Social Life in Singapore, Singapore: National University 
of Singapore, Department of Sociology, 2000 (unpublished, M. A. Thesis). Also see Suzaina Kadir, 
“Singapore: Engagement and Autonomy Within the Political Status Quo” in Civil Society and Political 
Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space, Muthiah Alagappa (eds.) (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2004), 324-354, who cites some examples in the literature of 
how the Internet has been a useful tool for civil society activists, and has been “a haven for 
Singaporeans wanting to question government polices, poke fun at the political system, and suggest 
alternative lifestyles”. 
17 Ooi Giok Ling and Afiza bte Hashim, “Civic Groups and the Internet in Singapore”, in Internet in 
ASEAN: Social and Cultural Impact, Sankaran Ramanathan (eds.) (Singapore: Public Relations 
Academy, 2003), 86-87. Also see Tan Chong Kee, “Impact of Technology in Enabling Discussion and 
Interaction”, in Constance Singam et al (eds.) Building Social Space in Singapore: The Working 
Committee’s Initiative in Civil Society Activism (Singapore: Select Publishing, 2002), 107, who cites 
the cases of how two civil society initiatives, the Sintercom and TWC, had leveraged the Internet to 
their advantage; Tan Chong Kee and Constance Singam, “Available Spaces, Today and Tomorrow”, in 
Constance Singam et al (eds.) Building Social Space in Singapore: The Working Committee’s Initiative 
in Civil Society Activism (Singapore: Select Publishing, 2002), 160, which gives an insight on how the 
Internet aided TWC to communicate and network, and Cherian George and Harish Pillay, “Media and 
Civil Society” in State-Society Relations in Singapore, Gillian Koh and Ooi Giok Ling (eds.) 
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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meeting room”.18 Thus, the Internet has allowed for the “emergence of niche civil 
society organisations that otherwise would not have come into existence”.19 
 Another significant contribution of the Internet lies in its provision for 
“alternative, mostly uncensored spaces for political expression and discussion, as well 
as alternative sources of information”—a contribution made possible through the 
infrastructure of the Internet—its “sheer massiveness…, its lack of a central source, 
its multiple avenues of communication…, its anonymity, and its constantly evolving 
nature”.20 This inability to police and censor cyberspace has also met civil society’s 
demand for increased political space to freely discuss issues and to cater to advocacy 
of respective interests, for example, creating e-petitions.21 Nonetheless, online civil 
society organisations still face certain legal restrictions, especially if they are 
perceived as “overstepping their boundaries”.22 Thus, some note that though the 
Internet assists civil society advocacy, it cannot replace civil society activism in actual 
physical space.23  
 Nonetheless, the impact of the Internet on civil society is undeniable, and Ho, 
Baber and Khondker’s study elucidates this. They observe that despite measures to 
control and regulate the public sphere and civil society, Singapore’s creation of a 
“knowledge based economy” through wiring up the nation has unintentionally 
expanded the public sphere and opened up civil society possibilities for certain kinds 
of engagement with state policies—a move virtually impossible in the pre-Internet 
                                                
18 George and Pillay, 201. 
19 Ooi and Hashim, 87. 
20 Ibid., 87. Also see Suzaina Kadir, “Singapore: Engagement and Autonomy Within the Political 
Status Quo” in Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic 
Space, Muthiah Alagappa (eds.) (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004), 324-354. 
21 Ooi and Hashim, 87. 
22 Ibid., 88. Also see George and Pillay, 202. 
23 Ooi and Hashim, 90. 
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era.24 Besides acting as alternative spaces, websites “can serve as beacons to attract 
dispersed citizens to an issue, a role Tocqueville attributed to newspapers”.25 Using 
five search engines over a four-month period to identify Singapore-related websites, 
collecting information about web-content, target audiences and website characteristics 
with the aim of surveying the “cyber-terrain of resistance”,26 the authors argue that the 
Internet, to some extent, has contributed to the emergence of an alternative public 
sphere. This therefore allows a free exchange of ideas in the abundance of websites, 
discussion groups and chat-groups devoted to the examination of critical issues that 
affect the lives of Singaporeans.27  
Besides concluding that with the Internet, civil society groups have new 
audiences and “possibilities for networking, organizing and debating and resisting the 
state’s agenda, contributing to the restructuring of state-society relations”,28 Ho, 
Baber and Khondker acknowledge that social control through surveillance limits the 
carving of these alternative spaces, reinforcing Calhoun’s opinion that computer 
mediated communications enhance existing power structures to a certain extent29 and 
that it is not easy to predict the possibilities and limits of resistance via this new 
technology in Singapore.30 Cherian George has commented on this problem in his 
examination of online journalism in which he compared four prominent media 
projects in Malaysia and Singapore. George argues that Singapore media activists 
have not exploited the limited technological capital as much as their Malaysian 
                                                
24 Kong Chong Ho, Zaheer Baber and Habibul Khondker, “‘Sites’ of Resistance: Alternative Websites 
and State-Society Relations”, British Journal of Sociology, 53, 1 (2002): 133. 
25 Ho, Baber and Khondker, 134, with reference to Klein, 216.  
26 Ibid., 134, with reference to Klein, 135.  
27 Ibid., 144. 
28 Ibid., 145. 
29 Craig Calhoun, “Community Without Propinquity Revisited: Communication Technology and the 
Transformation of the Urban Public Sphere”, Sociology Inquiry 68 (3) (1998): 381. Quoted in Ho, 
Baber and Khondker, 146. 
30 Ibid. 
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counterparts, due to Singapore’s less fertile socio-ideological ground.31 These issues 
of surveillance and auto-regulation are examined in the following section.  
   
(Auto-) regulation on the Internet 
As elucidated above, the Internet is perceived as a medium of heightened control of 
the citizenry since hi-tech methods can be employed for surveillance and monitoring 
on the World Wide Web (WWW). As such, freedom of speech and expression can 
possibly be deterred because of the Internet’s panoptical nature—that one cannot 
know whether one is being watched and therefore it is judicious to regulate one’s 
speech and actions automatically.32 Such self-regulation is particularly pronounced in 
Singapore, given the effectiveness of the state’s subtle disciplining capabilities, 
coupled with tight legislation over the Internet as a medium. These modes of 
regulation have circumscribed the Internet’s ability to play a larger role in expanding 
civil discourse sphere and curtailing opposition parties’ abilities to use the Internet 
effectively.33 
 Terence Lee examines the discourse of auto-regulation in a series of papers—
arguing that “regulating the internet and new media in Singapore is mostly about 
ensuring an automatic functioning of power for political expedience and longevity”.34  
                                                
31 Cherian George, Contentious Journalism and the Internet: Towards Democratic Discourse in 
Malaysia and Singapore (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006): 6-7. By engaging in the 
political process perspective, he explains the dynamics of contentious online journalism by concepts 
that social movements depend on: favourable shifts in political opportunities, the mobilization of 
resources and cultural framing work by activists.  
32 The notion of the panopticon will be discussed in the next chapter. 
33 Randolph Kluver, “The Singapore Experience” in Internet in ASEAN: Social and Cultural Impact, 
ed. Sankaran Ramanathan  (Singapore: Public Relations Academy, 2003). 
34 Terence Lee, “Internet Use in Singapore: Politics and Policy Implications”, Media International 
Australia incorporating Culture and Policy, 107 (2003): 75-88. See also Terence Lee, “Auto-regulating 
New Media: Strategies from Singapore’s Internet Policy”, Australian Journal of Communication 28 (1) 
(2001): 43-56; Terence Lee, “Policing the Internet in Singapore: From Self-Regulation to Auto-
regulation”, Communications Law Bulletin, 19 (4) (2001): 1-5; Terence Lee, “The Politics of Internet 
Policy and (Auto-)Regulation in Singapore”, Media International Australia Incorporating Culture and 
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Lee, along with David Birch, explores the ideology behind Singapore’s internet policy 
especially the censorship of content through a “light-touch” regulatory framework, 
concluding that “media conservatism is likely to continue in Singapore despite recent 
moves that would appear to “open up” Singapore society”.35 
 This light-touch regulatory framework is expanded upon in Lee’s other works, 
where he employs the Foucauldian framework and his notion of discipline as a 
functional apparatus that seeks to make the exercise of power more subtle, yet 
effective and efficient, thus arguing that a “light-touch” self-regulatory approach has 
worked—and continues to work—in Singapore because of “auto-regulation”.36 Lee 
illustrates how the authorities employ cryptic and arbitrary policies and legal codes to 
“shape, normalize and instrumentalize the conduct, thought, decisions, and aspirations 
of others”,37 and concludes that the Internet in Singapore is a highly contested space 
where the art of governmentality through various strategies is “tried, tested and 
subsequently perfected”.38  
 Garry Rodan also studies modes of regulation over the Internet, specifically 
examining the Peoples’ Action Party’s (PAP) authoritarian control on the Internet, 
bringing this medium under the same tight regimen as other electronic and non-
electronic media.39 Rodan argues that the Singapore model is successful because 
                                                                                                                                       
Policy 101 (2001): 33-42; Terence Lee, “The Politics of Civil Society in Singapore”, Asian Studies 
Review 26 (1) (2002): 97-117 and Terence Lee, “Internet Control and Auto-regulation in Singapore”, 
Surveillance & Society 3 (1) (2005): 74.  
<http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/aticles3(1)/singapore.pdf> (20 January 2006). 
35 Terence Lee and David Birch, “Internet Regulation in Singapore: A Policy/ing Discourse” Media 
International Australia incorporating Culture and Policy 95 (2000): 147-169. See also Lee, “Internet 
Use”: 75-88. 
36 Lee, “Internet Control”, 79. 
37 Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose, “Governing Economic Life”, Economy and Society, 19 (1) (1990): 
82. Quoted in Lee, “Internet Control”, 79. 
38 Ibid., 74.  
39 Garry Rodan, “The Internet and Political Control in Singapore”, Political Science Quarterly, 113 (1) 
(1998): 88. 
 9 
“when the political will to obstruct certain information and views is coupled with such 
variables as an efficient and technically competent bureaucracy, an established regime 
of political intimidation and surveillance, and embedded corporatist structures 
facilitating cooperation between state officials and administrators across the public 
and private sectors, you have a formidable mix”.40  
 Rodan further examines government measures directed at the Internet, which 
target attempts to harness the medium into organized collective action.41 He claims 
that constant adjustments of media controls can be seen as part of a wider process of 
fine-tuning the authoritarian regime that the PAP upholds,42 with the aims of 
preserving effective deterrents to civil society and limiting the Internet’s potential 
contribution to political pluralism.43 Thus, Rodan surmises that the strategy of the 
PAP is to ensure that the Internet as a medium does not facilitate political 
mobilisation, via limiting political engagement and competition to a narrow sphere of 
party politics and/or formally registered and tightly regulated political discussion 
groups, and by ensuring that linkages between opposition parties and social groups 
cannot take root.44 However, Rodan acknowledges that despite the tough measures, 
the expression of political views and the diffusion of, and access to information, have 
been able to take place because websites outside Singapore are hard to police. 
Nonetheless, Rodan suggests that the access to and political impact of Internet sites is 
still, to a large extent, mediated by surveillance, the ideological hegemony of the 
                                                
40 Ibid., 88. 
41 Garry Rodan, “Embracing Electronic Media but Suppressing Civil Society: Authoritarian 
Consolidation in Singapore”, The Pacific Review 16 (4) (2003): 503-524. 
42 Ibid., 519-520. 
43 Especially through the superimposition of the spirit of the Societies Act on cyberspace. Ibid., 513.  
44 Ibid., 505, 518. 
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PAP, and the high degrees of political alienation amongst the Singaporean populace.45 
Such factors impede the motivation of citizens to desire alternative accounts of 
domestic public affairs.  
 James Gomez comments on government regulations too, arguing that through 
its actions, the government has articulated a set of political out-of-bounds markers 
that remain vague.46 This allows it to reserve the right to define and direct political 
expression, whilst keeping consequences of adversarial activities ambiguous. This 
vagueness of what-can-be-said and what-cannot-be-said, dissuades political 
expression for fear of repercussions. Gomez categorises the censorship mechanism 
into two levels—on the first level, the individual voluntarily censors himself or 
herself, either through no discourse, or disguising it under euphemisms that 
substantially reduces the bite. On the second level, the individual calls others to 
attention and prevents them from further articulating any potentially adversarial 
remarks.47 This “culture of silence” and fear that pervades the average Singaporean 
has prompted scholars such as Wong Loong to remark that many are reluctant to 
voice their dissent because the idea of dissent is still dangerous to state and elite 
discourses and that the idea of the Internet has yet to take root.48  
 
Internet Political Discourse in the Region 
The literature on Internet political discourse encompasses case studies of various 
countries in the region, including China, Indonesia and Malaysia. China has served as 
an interesting case study due to the complex relationship among the government, the 
                                                
45 Ibid., 518.  
46 James Gomez, Self-Censorship: Singapore’s Shame (Singapore: Think Centre, 2000). 
47 Ibid., 56-57. 
48 Loong Wong, “The Internet and Social Change in Asia”, Peace Review 13 (3) (2001): 386. 
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Internet and the citizens. In “Who is setting the Chinese agenda”, Li, Xuan and 
Kluver examine a particular chatroom hosted by the People's Daily newspaper and 
find that participants in that forum have used it to post foreign news items and 
commentary that often undermined the government's position. Employing the case 
study of a political standoff with the United States involving an US surveillance 
aircraft that had crashed on Hainan Island,49 the authors demonstrated how the 
Internet had created opportunities to introduce new ideas into influential forums, 
undermining the ability of the Chinese government to solely set the political agenda 
although it had sought to censor chatrooms.50 They thus conclude that although the 
Internet might not directly challenge authoritarian regimes, it introduces information 
that forces authoritarian governments to respond and account for more outside 
sources, and in turn, increasing the transparency and professionalism of the Chinese 
sources themselves.51 They opine that if the Chinese government were to ignore the 
new information sphere brought about by ICT, their legitimacy would suffer, losing 
their capacity to influence public opinion.52 
 Similarly, in Indonesia, the Internet has played a crucial role in providing 
otherwise inaccessible information and challenging the centralised information from 
the government. This had ultimately caused the downfall of ex-President Suharto of 
Indonesia, as described by Merlyna Lim.53 Through the examination of the 
phenomenon of warnet, (the Internet cafe) that provided online access across 
                                                
49 Li Xiguang, et al., "Who is Setting the Chinese Agenda?", " in K. C. Ho et al. (eds.) Asia.com: Asia 
Encounters the Internet (London; New York: Taylor and Francis, 2003), 143-158. 
50 Ibid., 156. 
51 K. C. Ho et al. (eds.) Asia.com: Asia Encounters the Internet (London; New York: Taylor and 
Francis, 2003), 13. 
52 Li, 154-157. See also Nina Hachigian, "China's Cyber-strategy" in Foreign Affairs, 80 (2) (2001), 
118-134 where the author argued that the Internet will become a political threat in China in the long 
term due to the increasing prevalence of political dissidence.  
53 Merlyna Lim, "From Real to Virtual (And Back Again): Civil Society, Public Sphere, and the 
Internet in Indonesia" in K. C. Ho et al. (eds.) Asia.com: Asia Encounters the Internet, 10 
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Indonesia, Lim traces the emerging participation of civil society found in chatrooms, 
forums, and other online sites of civil society. She argues that civil society must 
emerge from a sense of identity that is forged through political struggles and 
illustrates the potential for the emergence of civil society in an authoritarian regime. 
Moreover, she makes a useful observation that “democratization” is perhaps an empty 
term with reference to these societies since the emerging political activists and classes 
are mostly drawn from a new digital elite.54 Only those who could afford the 
subscription fees and had access to computers could access the Internet.55 Thus, Lim 
makes a valid point stating that the Internet, though a powerful force, is not neutral to 
power.56 This is also applicable to the Singapore case, although there seems to be 
more direct access to the Internet by the population in Singapore but possibly less 
efficacy of Internet information in shaping politics. As this thesis illustrates, 
resistance on the Internet could be seen as taking a more passive role in the Singapore 
case than the Indonesian case.  
 Other scholars contend that the Internet’s potential for overthrowing 
authoritarian regimes has been an over-optimistic assessment. Kalathil and Boas’ 
Open Networks, Closed Regimes examines how societal and political actors in eight 
authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes employ the Internet, illuminating how 
the Internet may reinforce the mechanisms of control and give further power to 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, citing evidence from China, Cuba, Singapore, 
Vietnam, Burma, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.57 They argue 
that although public and civil society organisations have used the Internet 
                                                
54 Ibid., 12. 
55 Ibid., 118. 
56 Ibid., 125. 
57 Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor Boas, Open Networks, Closed Regime: The Impact of the Internet on 
Authoritarian Rule (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).  
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substantially, it has only played a background role and has not had much impact in 
provoking or facilitating political change in Singapore.58  
 Pertierra et al examine another technology, the cellphone, in Txt-ing Selves: 
Cellphones and Philippine Modernity, refuting the common assumption that the 
mobile phone was the factor in leading to the fall of ex-President Joseph Estrada.59 
They argue that despite the crucial role of the cellphone as a communicative device in 
facilitating the organisation and coordination of "EDSA 2",60 there were a host of 
other reasons that persuaded people to participate in the revolution. These factors 
include the perceived corruption and incompetence of the Estrada government and the 
vast amount of radio and television coverage of the Estrada impeachment trial.61 They 
further argue that the text messages disseminated were ineffectual in influencing the 
political views of these virtual citizens, since their views were already set. However, 
such messages would have reinforced the peoples' opinions and provided them with a 
sense of solidarity. Thus, according to the evidence the authors had collected, the 
technology's potential for overthrowing the ex-president had been wildly estimated. 
 The role of cellphones in Philippine politics could perhaps be compared to 
Internet politics in Singapore. While the use of cellphones in Philippines is 
widespread and the technology had played a major role in political mobilisation, the 
cellphone alone cannot bring about change in political mindset in Philippines. 
Similarly, in the case of Singapore, although there is a relatively high Internet 
                                                
58 Ibid., 74-83. 
59 Raul Pertierra, et al, Txt-ing Selves: Cellphones and Philippine Modernity (Manila: De La Salle 
University Press, Inc, 2002),  
Book available online at <http://www.finlandembassy.ph/texting1,htm#contents> 1 March 2007.  
60 EDSA is an acronym derived from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, the major highway that encircles 
Metro Manila. The popular revolution, also known as People Power II, peacefully overthrew Estrada in 
January 2001. 
61 Pertierra, et al, Txt-ing Selves. Available at <http://www.finlandembassy.ph/texting7,htm> 1 March 
2007.  
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penetration rate, the impact of the Internet has not been great enough to bring about 
significant political change, although it has greatly assisted civil society organisations 
as a tool of mobilisation. Nevertheless, the nature of these technologies and their 
different patterns of usage entail their different roles in society.  
 
The Significance of the Study and the Importance of the Singapore Case 
As depicted above, a significant amount of literature has concentrated on the political 
significance and effects of the Internet in Singapore, with research clustering around 
two focal points: the use of the Internet by civil society organisations and the issues of 
regulation and self-censorship on the Internet. There also exist some comparative and 
single case studies of the region which focus on the Internet’s potential for 
overthrowing authoritarian political regimes. These studies have varying conclusions 
on the potential for the Internet to bring about political change.  
 In order to supplement the existing literature on Internet political discourse, 
this thesis seeks to provide an insight to the particular context of the Singapore case, 
examining the specific modes of resistance practised. As highlighted above, the idea 
of the Internet as an effective site of resistance has unfortunately not been adequately 
explored in the Singapore context, for this politically significant question has been 
eclipsed by an emphasis on regulatory structures and their apparent gripping of the 
Internet as an arena for resistance. This neglect overlooks a rich amount of primary 
material nestled within websites, which can shed light on the modes in which netizens 
launched their own forms of resistance, exploiting loopholes in existing regulations, 
or uncovering different strategies in countering these forms of regulation.  This thesis 
thus seeks to modestly contribute to the existing literature, by exposing the various 
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layers of strategies of resistance on the Internet, thereby re-examining the 
commonplace view that political cyberspace is weak vis-à-vis the regulating 
Singaporean state.  
In Ho, Baber and Khondker's study, the authors identify websites by their 
orientation and nature of activity and point out that groups such as Sintercom and 
People Like Us (PLU) use the Internet as an effective medium for 'resistance' by 
refuting mainstream statements and providing alternative explanations.62 While their 
study has been useful in illustrating the diversity of positions in their analysis of web 
content; “the negotiation process between the state and civil society over various 
rights"; "how developments in cyber-space have implications for ‘reality’” and “how 
censorship and content regulation itself is a complicated process in which social 
control and resistance are simultaneously and seamlessly implicated”,63 this 
dissertation focuses on the various methods of resistance per se, and the process of 
negotiation between state and citizens.  
 The implications of this study are pertinent to the region and similar regimes 
around the world. As observed previously, a significant part of the literature points to 
the impression that the PAP has devised a strategy to allow for an authoritarian 
regime to successfully engage the technology of the Internet and reap the economic 
benefits, without being overwhelmed by its attendant political effects64. This model of 
Internet control has been regarded as influential amongst authoritarian states in Asia, 
with Vietnam and China attempting to duplicate the model.65 If this study is sound, it 
will problematise the assumption that the Singaporean model of Internet control 
                                                
62 Ho, Baber and Khondker, 141. 
63 Ibid., 133. 
64 Kalathil and Boas, 83. 
65 Rodan, “Internet and Political Control”, 87-88. 
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curtails political resistance in cyberspace, and that the Internet will solely consolidate 
a climate of fear and intimidation, create avenues of propaganda and information 
dissemination, and serve as another medium dominated by the powerful.66  
 Therefore, this study will focus on what has been previously glossed over— 
the rich data on many forums, blogs and other websites that illustrate various 
strategies of resistance. Such findings from fieldwork conducted in this study will 
attempt to dispel the commonplace assumption that there is “disinterest in political 
uses of the Internet” due to the government’s intolerance for political dissent.67 In a 
country where freedom of speech, expression and association is curbed by the state, 
and to a large extent by self-censorship, many turn to the Internet as a medium to 
exercise these denied rights. Although “active citizenry” is ostensibly encouraged by 
the ruling party, this is mere rhetoric because blurred out-of-bound (OB) markers as 
outlined by the state constrict critical discourse. Many choose to use the Internet as a 
testing ground to experiment with and locate the vague OB markers placed by the 
state, to push the boundaries to produce critical discourse, and to challenge the 
government’s stranglehold over the media. 
 Such forms of resistance are nuanced however, given the nature of the 
Singaporean case. How then, are we to recognise such elusive modes of resistance 
when they are expressed in socio-political life? That is a question that this thesis seeks 
to answer, through the analysis of the political importance of the Internet as a site of 
resistance. More specifically, the main research question is: How can we understand 
strategies of resistance on the Internet in light of the panoptic environment in the 
                                                
66 Ibid., 89. 
67 Lee, “Internet Control”, 78. Others argue that it is political apathy that explains the disinterest in 
political uses of the Internet.  See Terence Chong, “Time to rouse ourselves from apathy”, The Straits 
Times, 14 January 2005, which examines the culture of political apathy in Singapore. 
 17 
case of Singapore? In attempting to answer this question, this thesis seeks to make a 
modest contribution to existing literature via an in-depth analysis into the dynamics of 
resistance residing within forum discussions, blogs and other websites. The next 
chapter thus proceeds to lay out the analytical framework and outline the main 

























“Everyday Forms of Resistance” on the Internet 
 
This thesis seeks to apply the Gramscian framework of hegemony to the context of 
Singapore politics to understand the dynamics of political resistance in Singapore. In 
particular, this framework is useful in explaining how technological advances 
generate ever-increasing possibilities for some segments of society, while the state 
continuously attempts to win consent for its Internet policies and wider legitimacy. In 
employing the larger Gramscian framework of hegemony to analysis the aspects of 
such struggles, this dissertation also invokes some concepts in the seminal works of 
James Scott’s Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance68 and 
Domination and the Arts of Resistance69 to illustrate the various strategies of 
resistance that netizens undertake in the Singapore context. By doing so, the study 
aims to conceptualise alternative and substantial ways to think about and analyse 
resistance in Singapore.  
 
Analytical Framework 
Hegemony, according to Hall’s reading of Gramsci, refers to:  
all those processes whereby a fundamental social group [Gramsci speaks of alliance 
of class strata, not of a unitary and unproblematic “ruling class”], which has achieved 
direction over the ‘decisive economic nucleus’, is able to expand this into a moment 
of social, political and cultural leadership and authority throughout civil society and 
the state, attempting to unify and reconstruct the social formation around an organic 
tendency through a series of ‘national tasks’.70  
 
                                                
68 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985). 
69 Scott, Domination. 
70 Stuart Hall, “Cultural Studies and the Centre, some problematics and problems,” in Culture, Media, 
Language, ed. Stuart Hall et. al. (London: Hutchinson; [Birmingham, West Midlands]: Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham, 1980), 35. 
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For Gramsci, hegemony is never uncontested and “is always the (temporary) mastery 
of a particular theatre of struggle.”71  
Thus, in examining the Singaporean case, this study dispenses with the 
tendency to regard hegemony as rigid, static, uniform—that there exists only one 
dominant, totalising culture of power—a reading Gramsci certainly did not intend. 
Instead, this study focuses on “counter-hegemonies and a whole series of competing 
alternative hegemonies”, “recognizing that hegemonies are constructed” and that they 
are “ongoing ‘projects’ of legitimating leadership and negotiating consent through a 
whole series of channels”.72 Some scholars interpret Gramsci’s invoking of the term 
“war of manoeuvre”, a term drawn from military warfare, as: 
… seeing society as both a real and an ideological battlefield where everyone is 
trying to establish what side they are on, who are enemies, who are allies, what 
position they are in, what the terrain looks like, how the battle is progressing and 
what weapons they should use. It is a constant ongoing struggle within which ideas, 
beliefs, values and meanings are among the weapons. However, what is important is 
not any innate characteristics of these weapons but whether they are effectively 
deployed. This sense of hegemony as a process of active organisation is a useful one 
which is not restricted to understanding class relations.73 
 
 Femia thus notes that Gramsci privileges the “war of position” (protracted 
trench warfare) over the “war of movement” (rapid frontal assault on the adversary’s 
base)—the former strategy referring to “a gradual shift in the balance of social and 
cultural forces”, an “organic” dimension of revolutionary change.74 According to 
Gramsci, a “‘war of position’ on the cultural front” requires “steady penetration and 
subversion of the complex and multiple mechanisms of ideological diffusion”,75 
whereas a “war of movement” is futile.  
                                                
71 Ibid., 36. 
72 Elaine Baldwin, Brian Longhurst, Scott McCracken, Miles Ogborn and Greg Smith, Introducing 
Cultural Studies (Harlow: Pearson; Prentice Hall, 1999): 106-107. 
73 Ibid., 107. 
74 Joseph V. Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary 
Process (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 53. 
75 Ibid., 51-52. 
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Scott, in some ways, echo Gramsci’s concept of “war of position”, in that it 
involves probing for weak points in a façade of power, offering the marginalised a 
way to work the system to their minimum disadvantage. In Domination, Scott 
uncannily uses the metaphor of “guerrilla warfare” to understand the process of 
resistance, and states that: 
[w]ithin relations of domination, as in guerilla warfare, there is an understanding on 
both sides about the relative strength and capacities of the antagonist and therefore 
about what the likely response to an aggressive move might be. What is most 
important for our purposes, though, is that the actual balance of forces is never 
precisely known, and estimates about what it might be are largely inferred from the 
outcomes of previous probes and encounters. Assuming, as we must, that both sides 
hope to prevail, there is likely to be a constant testing of the equilibrium. One side 
advances a salient to see if it survives or is attacked and, if so, in what strength. It is 
in this no-man’s-land of feints, small attacks, probing to find weaknesses, and not in 
the rare frontal assault, that the ordinary battlefield lies.76 
 
 Although the Gramscian framework can illustrate the complex struggle and 
negotiation of hegemony and power, Scott is particularly useful in illuminating the 
various strategies of resistance peasants employ that parallel those that some netizens 
in Singapore undertake. In Weapons, Scott summarises the problem of the expression 
of resistance by the “weak” when he says that open collective protest is rare.77 His 
study of peasant resistance reveals how arson, pretty theft, poaching, sabotage, and 
boycotts are the “garden variety resistances”78 seen in everyday life in his 
                                                
76 Scott, Domination, 192-193.As the study of hegemony is integral to this thesis, it would be useful to 
problematise Scott’s understanding of hegemony as the “dominant ideology thesis”, although it is not 
the main focus of the thesis to do so. Scott’s insistence on the power of the hidden transcript to inform 
opposition pivots around his critique of hegemony and “false consciousness”, and in what is an 
admittedly “brief and schematic” critique of various approaches to Gramsci’s understanding of 
hegemony. See Robin D. G. Kelly, “An Archaeology of Resistance” American Quarterly 44 (2) 
(1992): 294. Unfortunately, Scott ignores important theorists like Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall. 
Furthermore, he barely mentions Gramsci’s writings on hegemony, and his work on the crucial role of 
the “war of position”. Scott concludes that the concept itself contains the “implicit assumption that the 
ideological incorporation of subordinate groups will necessarily diminish social conflict”, thus 
implying that hegemony allows for little or no contest, and that whatever opposition arises can be 
easily incorporated or channelled. However, the Gramscian notion of hegemony presumes contest, and 
that hegemonic institutions are constantly forced to respond, to fight for territory which is often lost. 
77 Scott, Weapons, 29. 
78 Ibid., 241. 
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ethnographic study of peasant life in “Sedaka”, a village in Malaysia.79 According to 
Scott, when we do see the instances of open collective protest or demonstrations, 
these are but ripples on the surface of a deeper and more diffuse pattern of struggles. 
What began as an attempt to understand the absence of open resistance in Sedaka 
gradually led to the conceptualisation of infrapolitics—a whole body of “behind-the-
scenes” political discourse.80  
 Infrapolitics can be seen as a way to explain the changing meaning of politics 
and resistance in most forms of day-to-day, dominant-subordinate relations. Scott 
notes that in the context of increasingly complex societies, the absence of openly 
declared contestations should not be mistaken for acquiescence. It is in the realm of 
informal assemblages such as the parallel market, workplace, household and local 
community, where people negotiate resources and values on an everyday basis, that 
“counterhegemonic consciousness is elaborated”.81 These are the sites of infrapolitical 
                                                
79 “Sedaka” is not the real name of the village that Scott spent his two years doing fieldwork in. It is a 
small (seventy-household), rice-farming community in the main paddy-growing area of Kedah. 
80 As Scott points out, the idea behind Domination developed as a result of making observations about 
power relations and discourse in a Malay village in his prior work, Weapons, which was as a “close, 
textural, contingent, and historically grounded analysis”. Domination is admittedly more “eclectic and 
schematic” in its approach, that draws similarities from the broad patterns of domination in the cases of 
slavery, serfdom, and caste subordination across cultures, “to see what it can teach us about power, 
hegemony, resistance and subordination”. 
81 Scott, Domination, 200. Scott claims that he hopes to show “that the notion of hegemony and its 
related concepts of false-consciousness, mystification, and ideological state apparatuses not only fail to 
make sense of class relations in Sedaka, but also are just as likely to mislead us seriously in 
understanding class conflict in most situations” and argues that “the concept of hegemony ignores the 
extent to which most subordinate classes are able, on the basis of their daily material experience, to 
penetrate and demystify the prevailing ideology”. See Scott, Weapons, 317. He draws his critique of 
hegemony largely from what he calls the “excellent general critique of hegemony in its various guises” 
by Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Bryan Turner, The Dominant Ideology Thesis (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1980). However, he glosses over Gramsci’s take of hegemony which presumes 
contest, and hegemonic institutions are constantly forced to respond, to fight for territory which is often 
lost. According to Kelley, the dichotomy of “true” and “false” consciousness are “terms neither 
Gramsci, Hall, nor Williams ever accepted”. See Kelly, “An Archaeology of Resistance”, 295. To thus 
conceive of hegemony, as Scott has, by ignoring Gramsci’s focus on struggle, or to accept the rather 
inadequate dichotomy between “true” and “false” consciousness, is to erroneously reduce Gramsci’s 
theory of hegemony into a “theory of consensus”. See Kelly, 295. For Gramsci, therefore, hegemony is 
never uncontested and “is always the (temporary) mastery of a particular theatre of struggle.” This 
shows that Scott’s understanding and critique of Gramscian hegemony is misplaced and it would be 
befitting of this thesis to adhere to Hall’s interpretation (see Stuart Hall, “Cultural Studies and the 
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activities that range from foot-dragging, squatting, and gossip to the development of 
dissident subcultures.82  
 Infrapolitics is thus identified by juxtaposing what Scott calls the “public” and 
“hidden transcripts”.83 Public transcripts are the public records of superior-
subordinate relations in which the latter appears to acquiesce willingly to the stated 
and unstated expectations of the former. Scott likens this to a performance between 
dominant and subordinate groups in which the oppressed, out of a prudent awareness 
of power, usually play the roles expected of them. However, Scott does say that the 
public transcript is not the real story, for offstage, in their “sequestered social sites”, 
subordinate groups challenge ideological hegemony by constructing the “hidden 
transcripts”—dissident political cultures that manifest themselves in daily 
conversations, folklore, jokes, songs and other cultural practices of oppressed people.  
 One can also find the hidden transcript emerging “on stage”, in spaces 
controlled by the powerful, though mostly in disguised or coded discursive forms. 
Hidden transcripts, in short, consist of what subordinate parties say and do beyond the 
realm of the public transcript or the observation of the dominant. This often surfaces 
as everyday forms of resistance—theft, foot-dragging, and the destruction of property. 
                                                                                                                                       
Centre, Some Problematics and Problems,” in Culture, Media, Language, ed. Stuart Hall et. Al. 
(London: Hutchinson; (Birmingham, West Midlands): Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 
University of Birmingham, 1980), 35 – 36.  Scott could have also benefited from a reading of 
Raymond William’s work on Gramsci, for he would have then realised that despite his dismissal of 
Gramscian hegemony, he inadvertently echoes Gramscian thought. He states that “the subordinate 
classes to be found at the base of what we historically call revolutionary movements are typically 
seeking goals well within their understanding of the ruling ideology”, thus reinforcing the Gramscian 
notion that subordinate groups challenging hegemony frequently draw their arsenal from dominant 
discourses. Williams backs this notion when he opines that, “the dominant culture… at once produces 
and limits its own forms of counter-culture” (see Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), 114); that even the most militant opposition is almost always 
“structured” or constrained by the dominant ideology, “though subordinate groups are still capable of 
penetrating and breaking aspects of hegemony” (see Kelley, 295). 
82 James H. Mittelman and Christine B. N. Chin, “Conceptualising resistance to globalization” in The 
Global Resistance Reader, ed. Louise Amoore (London and New York: Routledge, 2005): 22. 
83 Scott, Domination, 1-16. 
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In the context of surveillance structures set up by dominant class(es) or the state, 
hidden transcripts record infrapolitical activities that surreptitiously challenge 
practices of economic, status and ideological domination.84  
However, there is a third realm of subordinate group politics that lies 
strategically between the public and hidden transcript—the politics of disguise and 
anonymity that takes place in public view but is designed to have a double meaning or 
to shield the identity of actors.85 According to Scott, rumour, gossip, folktales, jokes, 
songs, rituals, codes, and euphemism—a good part of the folk culture of subordinate 
groups—fit this description.86 This thesis thus draws parallels of this realm of 
resistance to Singapore.  
 The applicability of Scott’s works is admittedly confined to peasant studies 
and the politics of the subaltern. This draws a sharp contrast to the Singaporean 
Internet-users, the subjects of this study, who possess financial and technological 
capital, that excludes them from being compared the marginalised peasants that Scott 
was referring to. However, this does not diminish the worth of Scott’s schematic 
concepts surrounding infrapolitics, for they are sufficiently fluid and relevant for this 
study. The term “weak” is thus reappropriated to the Singapore context, whereby the 
idea of weakness is translatable in the author’s description of the regime of 
censorship. The “weak”, “subordinate” or “marginalised”87 in the Singaporean case 
are those who are constrained by legal implications of open protests and 
                                                
84 Mittelman and Chin, 22. 
85 Scott, Domination, 18-19. 
86 Ibid., 19. 
87 The reason why the words like “weak”, “marginalised” and “subordinate” are used with inverted 
commas is due to the fact that these words used in the context of Gramsci and Scott are significantly 
different from this study. While Gramsci and Scott have used these terms to describe of represent those 
who are dominated in terms of class conflict: the working class/proletariat/poverty-stricken peasants, 
the same terms used in this study refer to a group of people who are actually affluent enough to have 
access to computers and the Internet—not exactly what one may consider subordinate groups. 
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confrontation, and those whose outlets are limited by the severe practice of self-
censorship by the government-controlled press. The larger framework on dominant-
subordinate relations thus resonates with the Singaporean context where the PAP 
appears to dominate public discourse and deny civil rights like freedom of speech and 
expression. Public protests and open declarations of these rights are therefore rare, for 
the political environment is such that individuals may face castigation if they attempt 
open confrontation. The voice of resistance is thus muted at this level of public 
transcript. Where it does speak, therefore, is on the Internet, sometimes under the 
guise of anonymity, of humour through satire and parody, gossip and rumour, as well 
as grumbling. This space seems to fall between the realm of the public and hidden 
transcript because such activity seeks to attract as much attention possible through the 
use of hidden messages to convey unhappiness over certain governmental regulation 
and policies. Therefore, this study suggests that the realm of such resistance in 
cyberspace is tangibly vibrant—a phenomena that has unfortunately escaped 
academic focus in works on the political aspects of cyberspace.  
 Assumptions that Singaporeans are politically apathetic,88 voiceless and 
uncritical can therefore be re-examined in light of this growing phenomenon—that the 
Internet is being used as a tool of communication and site of counter-
hegemonic resistance by “marginalised” citizens who have been largely denied the 
opportunities of freedom of expression and speech in the “offline” world. 
 With the Internet, citizens now have a political space to air their grievances, 
disaffection and discontent towards the dominant party and their respective policies in 
an arena that is impossible to monitor fully. These websites, forums and blogs appeal 
                                                
88 See Chong, “Time to Rouse Ourselves From Apathy”, which examines the culture of political apathy 
in Singapore. 
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to people because they can air their dissenting views rather anonymously, in a site 
between the hidden and public transcript. One can detect satire and humour that 
highlight injustice, unfairness and biased media framing in a site that lies strategically 
between the site of the hidden and public transcript. This contrasts with the public 
transcript, where one does not observe direct confrontation with authority (because 
the citizenry are not afforded the luxury of relatively safe, open political opposition). 
  This thesis argues that the "marginalised" in Singapore exploit the use of 
cyberspace, a realm that is impossible to fully control, to constantly negotiate the 
subtle disciplining mechanisms of the state, drawing from its arsenal various 
strategies of resistance: the veil of anonymity, gossip, rumour, the safe disguise of 
humour in satire/parodies and “rightful resistance”; thereby offering counter-
hegemonic readings, alternative discourses and dissenting opinions in various 
ways that circumvent existing laws and regulations. The cyber terrain is thus a 
brimming site of resistance and struggle for hegemony, “always pressing, testing, 
probing the boundaries of the permissible”.89 It is therefore vital to demonstrate how, 
on one hand, the state tries to win the battleground by imposing regulatory structures 
to counter resistance, trying to control the public transcript, and how, on the other 
hand, the state has to concede some pockets of space to netizens who through various 
strategies, resist and push the boundaries of the realm of resistance that lie between 
the hidden and public transcript. This is the Gramscian notion of hegemony that 
presumes contest, and that hegemonic institutions are constantly forced to respond, to 
fight for territory which is often lost. 
                                                
89 Scott, Domination, 200. 
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 This thesis will also re-examine and subsequently challenge the policy 
discourse of auto-regulation, by appropriating Foucault’s critique of the disciplinary 
power of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon prison structure, thereby shedding light on 
the myth of the invincible authoritarian state. The panopticon functioned as a 
nineteenth-century version of the surveillance camera and was Bentham’s plan for 
constructing a prison resembling a wheel around a hub of an observing warden, with 
the warden being able to look in on the prisoners but not vice-versa. Consequently, 
the prisoners would logically strive to behave according to expectations for fear of 
being watched by a warden that might or might not be there. The self-surveillance of 
the prisoners and the odious possibility of an all-seeing eye that might or might not be 
present is likened by Foucault to the state’s ability to cause its citizen to police 
themselves, regardless of whether the state regulates them or not. 90  
 This phenomenon is especially reflective of the Singaporean case as Lee 
argues, for the surveillance structures that regulate activities on the Internet—auto-
regulation, is based upon the belief that power, the “political management of the 
Singapore populace”, is perfected when it is “automized” and disindividualized”.91 
Hence Lee, in Foucauldian fashion, opines that the auto-regulatory strategies of the 
state “are calculated to attain policy compliance and political subservience, [and] the 
shaping of disciplined and ‘docile bodies’”.92 In such a panoptic environment, Lee 
believes that “the technologies of governmentality can be readily mobilized for 
various social, cultural and political ends”.93 These auto-regulatory strategies in the 
form of laws and regulations curbing Internet content will be elaborated in Chapter 
                                                
90 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan, (New York: 
Random House, 1977). 
91 Ibid., 201-202. Quoted in Lee, “Internet Control”, 80. 
92 Lee, “Internet Control”, 84. 
93 Ibid., 89. 
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Two. Although the Foucauldian analysis of the Internet is not the main focus of this 
dissertation, the literature on the Internet refers to this to a large extent. Thus, this 
study, using a Gramscian approach, seeks to respond to this.  
 Chapter Two illustrates the modes in which the government exerts pressures to 
minimize dissent on the Internet. In addition, this study will show how the state is 
incapable of censoring all forms of dissent on cyberspace, not only because of lack of 
technical capabilities to track anonymous users and to contain them, but also because 
of the difficulties in trying to penalise resistive strategies. Part of the argument of the 
thesis is that it is virtually impossible for the state to control political dissent in such a 
massive entity, and that the Internet remains as a site of political struggle. 
 This does not mean that it is totally impossible for the state to track down 
anonymous users on the Internet, but that it is cumbersome to do so, and subjecting 
them to prosecution would be tantamount to a political fiasco that would therein 
delegitimise the PAP’s rule. The continuance of PAP’s hegemony entails hard work 
as the state has to constantly fight for territory, amidst seeking legitimacy for its 
actions. So while the state can install built-in mechanisms in the mainstream media to 
censor dissenting views, the same techniques cannot be employed in cyberspace. 
Furthermore, censoring humour poses as a significant challenge, for attempting to 
regulate those who appeal to state rhetoric when expressing dissent, can be perceived 
as compromising the state’s political legitimacy. It will be shown in subsequent 
chapters, that in trying to reclaim the public transcript, the state adopts these auto-
regulatory strategies on the Internet, but seems to concede this space somewhat in the 
form of a “light-touch” strategy. 
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Strategies of Resistance: Anonymity, Gossip/Rumour, Satire/Parody and 
“Rightful Resistance” 
 
In the chapter “Voice Under Domination: the Arts of Political Disguise”, Scott directs 
attention to the “manifold strategies by which subordinate groups manage to insinuate 
their resistance, in disguised forms, into the public transcript”,94 where he examines 
the ways that “ideological resistance is disguised, muted, and veiled for safety’s 
sake”.95 The realities of power subordination require that “we enter the world of 
rumor, gossip, disguises, linguistic tricks, metaphors, euphemisms, folktales, ritual 
gestures and anonymity”.96 This study attempts to examine the uses of 
satire/parody/humour, anonymity, gossip/rumour and “rightful resistance” as 
strategies of resistance on the Internet. 
 Anonymity, or cloaking one’s identity, is a strategy which netizens use while 
stepping into the “public transcript” online. As discussed earlier, a subordinate 
conceals the hidden transcript from powerholders because he fears retaliation. 
However, “if it is possible to declare the hidden transcript while disguising the 
identity of the persons declaring it, much of the fear is dissipated”.97 As Scott 
highlights, prominent techniques to shield one’s identity while facilitating open 
criticism, threats and attacks include “spirit possession, gossip, aggression through 
magic, rumor, anonymous threats and violence, the anonymous letter, and anonymous 
mass defiance”.98 In cyberspace, it is common for users on forums, blogs and other 
websites not to divulge their real identities, save for a few prominent bloggers. 
Therefore, the message is public but the messenger is hidden. Although it is not 
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technically impossible to trace the identities of Internet users given the extensive 
technical capacity of the authorities, it takes a significant amount of effort to trace the 
user. The idea of anonymity relates closely to the earlier discussion on the idea of the 
panoptic structure of the Internet—because the user feels that he is under surveillance, 
he wears a mask to hide from the prison warden. Under this mask, he feels a greater 
sense of security and is less intimidated by the prying warden and feels more 
confident of voicing the hidden transcript without immediate repercussion. As he is 
aware that there are many others in cyberspace who wear a mask just like him, he 
chooses to believe that it is impossible for the warden to be rigorously trying to 
unmask all of them simultaneously, and even if they successfully attempt to, are 
unable to discipline all of them at once.  
 Gossip is another prevalent online technique of resistance and “is perhaps the 
most familiar and elementary form of disguised popular aggression”.99 Scott 
acknowledges that while gossip “is hardly confined to attacks by subordinates on their 
superiors, it represents a relatively safe social sanction”.100  
Gossip, almost by definition, has no identifiable author, but scores of eager retailers 
who can claim they are just passing on the news. Should the gossip—and here I have 
in mind malicious gossip—be challenged, everyone can disavow responsibility for 
having originated it. The Malay term for gossip and rumor, khabar angin (news on 
the wind), captures the diffuse quality of responsibility that makes such aggression 
possible.101 
 
Gossip is thus distinguished from rumour in that “gossip consists typically of 
stories that are designed to ruin the reputation of some identifiable person or 
persons.”102 Scott asserts that above all, “gossip is a discourse about social rules that 
have been violated”, in that “a person’s reputation can be damaged by stories about 
                                                





his tightfistedness, his insulting words, his cheating, or his clothing only if among 
whom such tales circulate have shared standards of generosity, polite speech, honesty 
and appropriate dress”.103 Gossip acts to “reinforce these normative standards by 
invoking them and by teaching anyone who gossips precisely what kinds of conduct 
are likely to be mocked or despised.”104 Even in its strong form of character 
assassination, gossip is a “relatively mild sanction against the powerful”, but it 
presupposes “not only a face-to-face community, but also one in which reputation is 
still of some importance and value”.105 
 Rumour, “a second cousin” of gossip, is not necessarily directed at a particular 
person, but is a “powerful form of anonymous communication that can serve 
particular interests”.106 As Scott suggests “oral transmission of rumor allows for a 
process of elaboration, distortion, and exaggeration that is so diffuse and collective it 
has no discernible author”.107 The spread of rumour on the Internet, albeit not oral in 
nature, acts in a similar manner. It is in cyberspace that information, whether true or 
not, can spread through the network of forums, newsgroups, blogs and other websites 
quickly. As a rumour travels, “it is altered in a fashion that brings it more closely into 
line with the hopes, fears, and worldview of those who hear it and those who retell 
it”.108 Authorities often question the credibility of these two avenues of resistance by 
highlighting their anonymous nature as a serious point of contention. As such, gossip 
and rumours are often dismissed as frivolous “Internet chatter” that has no substance 
precisely because of its “unverifiable” or “false” nature. 
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 It will also be shown how the features of fiction and humour in satire and 
parody are strategies of hegemonic resistance on the Internet. The genres of satire and 
parody seem to fit what Scott suggests as the world of “…disguise, linguistic tricks 
and metaphors…”109 The definitive elements of humour, theatrics and hyperbole in 
satire effectively humiliate authority figures and simultaneously places itself almost 
beyond the reach of litigation. Ironically, it is satire’s place in the realm of fiction, 
comedy and Art that renders it impervious to authoritative constraint.110 
 Scholars have noted the difficulty in coming up with a neat definition of 
satire.111 Satire is often defined by the necessary conditions that distinguish it. Frye 
suggests that wit or humor and attack are essential to satire,112 while Nilsen adds a 
few more “necessary conditions” that are definitive of satire, namely: irony, 
negativity, distortion and humor.113 Combe notes that a key danger in theorising satire 
is “that almost irresistible urge to reify satire, unifying and totalizing a range of often 
incommensurate impulses and practices”. He reasons that “individual satires are 
nothing if they are not, to borrow a phrase from Stephen Greenblatt, ‘localized 
strategies in particular historical encounters’”.114 However, this study utilises Stott’s 
definition of satire, “a literary form that aims to criticize or censure people and ideas 
through the use of humour”.115 
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 Hodgart opines that “the perennial topic of satire is the human condition 
itself”, in which “satire, ‘the use of ridicule, sarcasm, irony etc. to expose, attack, or 
deride vices, follies etc.’ (as the dictionaries define it), has its origin in a state of mind 
which is critical and aggressive, usually one of irritation at the latest examples of 
human absurdity, inefficiency or wickedness.”116 He views humans as social animals 
who are “aggressive to their own kind” and who use “threat display” to maintain the 
efficient functioning of their hierarchy in each of their societies.117 These threat 
displays that social animals use against each other, until the inferior submits to the 
superior, seem to be the basis of “human expression of contempt, the curling lip and 
the mocking laugh”.118 
The satirist’s anger is modified by his sense of superiority and contempt for his 
victim: his aim is to make the victim lose ‘face’ and the most effective way of 
humiliating him is by contemptuous laughter.119 
 
According to Stott: 
Satire aims to denounce folly and vice and urge ethical and political reform through 
the objection of ideas to humorous analysis. In the best instances, it takes the object 
matter from the heart of political life or cultural anxiety, re-framing issues at an 
ironic distance that enables us to revisit fundamental questions that have been 
obscured by rhetoric, personal interests, or realpolitik.120 
 
Raising the example of Stanley Kubrick’s 1963 film, Dr Strangelove; or, How I 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, Stott shows “how satire can ask a 
question that has been dismissed by the establishment as naïve, but remains absolutely 
crucial to the future of humanity”.121 Although Kubrick issued a disclaimer over the 
title sequence, stating that “…none of the characters portrayed in this film are meant 
to represent any real persons living or dead”, Stott points out the real life individuals 
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that the protagonists are based on. He argues that “the film’s insistence on its 
fictionality reveals its acute sensitivity to the potential volatility of its satire”.122 
 Similarly, the definition of parody has been extensively explored by 
academics.123 It has been defined as “any cultural practice which makes a relatively 
polemical allusive imitation of another cultural production or practice” and can be 
thought of “as mode, or as a range in the spectrum of possible intertextual 
relations”.124 Palmer suggests that in parody, “some pre-existing discursive entity is 
both repeated (in part or in whole) and simultaneously transformed, in some measure, 
commonly for humour and/or ridicule”125 and the purpose “may be mockery of the 
original, mockery of some other associated entity, or mere playful allusion”.126 
 One feature that surrounds satires and parodies on the Internet illustrated in 
this study is the element of comedy that disguises resistance. Stott points out that 
“humour has been demonstrably policed or punished by many governments who see it 
as a form of subversion”, citing the cases of the Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia and the 
US in the 1950s, during the McCarthy era.127 Wary of the danger of humour and 
ridicule, politicians have sought to control satirists and comedians. The power of 
laughter thus seems profound indeed—people in positions of power, especially those 
who view themselves as highly rational, efficient, serious and important, feel the most 
powerless when they are ridiculed and their actions trivialised. This is where laughter 
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hits most acutely.128 This is descriptive of the bureaucratic elites in the PAP, who are 
precisely threatened by the power of humour in the Internet. 
 Hodgart suggests that political satire requires “a degree of free speech” to 
flourish because tyrants dislike any form of criticism.129 The domain of cyberspace 
allows for this element of freedom of expression because this space is not given the 
same value of importance as the mainstream media in terms of the extent of 
readership in the eyes of the authorities. In the following chapters, it will be 
exemplified how the government, in acknowledging that cyberspace is difficult to 
control, seems to undermine the strategies of resistance used in cyberspace, and yet 
concede some pockets of resistance. 
 Another strategy from the arsenal of resistance refers to Kevin O’Brien’s 
notion of “rightful resistance”: 
a form of popular contention that 1) operates near the boundary of an authorized 
channel, 2) employs the rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to curb political 
or economic power, and 3) hinges on locating and exploiting divisions among the 
powerful. In particular, rightful resistance entails the innovative use of laws, policies, 
and other officially promoted values to defy “disloyal” political and economic elites; 
it is a kind of partially sanctioned resistance that uses influential advocates and 
recognized principles to apply pressure on those in power who have failed to live up 
to some professed ideal or who have not implemented some beneficial measure.130  
 
In other words, rightful resistance works when people make “legitimate” claims, 
appealing to the sympathies of the ruling elites working within the parameters of 
official laws, regulations, or policies. They “normally frame their claims with 
reference to protections implied in ideologies or conferred by policymakers” and 
“since they often demand little more than scrupulous enforcement of existing 
commitments, theirs is a defiance based on strict adherence to established values”.131 
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Thus, the Internet functions as both a realm for the hidden transcript where people 
engage in “offstage talk”, where a critique of power is spoken “behind the back of the 
dominant”, and a site of public transcript where individuals insinuate their resistance 
with the appeal of state rhetoric. 
 
Methodology 
In an attempt to analyse cyberspace in a systematic fashion, this paper presents a 
typology of cyberspace entities in Table 1, mainly websites that focus on providing 
alternative news or commentary pieces; websites that are owned by organisations or 
parties in order for public communication; websites that present politically satirical 
humour; communicative and interactive discussion forums, and blogs. This study 
acknowledges overlaps among the various entities, which will be elaborated in the 
following chapters.  
 





New Sintercom <www.newsintercom.org>; 
Singaporeans for Democracy <http://www.sfdonline.org/>; 
Singapore Window <wwwsingapore-window.org>; 
Think Centre <www.thinkcentre.org>; 
The Void Deck <http://www.thevoiddeck.org> 
 
Satirical/Humour                                                     TalkingCock.com <www.talkingcock.com> 
Discussion forums/Newsgroups sgforums.com <www.sgforums.com>; 







Blogs A Xeno Boy in Sg <http://xenoboysg.blogspot.com>;  
Molly Meek <http://mollymeek.livejournal.com>; 
Mr Brown <http://www.mrbrown.com/>; 
Mr Miyagi <http://miyagi.sg/>; 
Mr Wang Bakes Good Karma 
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<www.commentarysingapore.blogspot.com>; 
SG Rally <http://sgrally.blogspot.com>; 
Singabloodypore <www.singabloodypore.blogspot.com>; 
Singapore Election Watch 
<http://singaporeelection.blogspot.com>; 





Association of Women for Action and Research  (AWARE) 
<www.aware.org.sg>; 
Peoples’ Action Party (PAP)  <www.pap.org.sg> 
Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) 
<www.singaporedemocrat.org>;  




 This study disaggregrates the notion of the Internet into various entities 
characterised by their functions and foci, such as providing alternative news, sites for 
discussion forums and personal blogs. This examination will hopefully elucidate the 
intricacies and dynamics of Internet resistance. 
 The qualitative research analysis is grounded in a study of Singapore-related 
websites, discussion forums and blogs that may or may not be hosted in Singapore. 
The study examines online activities surrounding the 2006 General Elections 
(GE2006), the various reactions by Internet users and counter-reactions from the 
government offline. The method of content analysis and process-tracing will be 
utilised to map out the evolving online discourse and the various weapons and 
strategies of the “weak”, and the resultant responses from the authorities.  To study 
cyberspace, the field work undertaken combines ethnographic methods that analyse 
postings and threads in discussion forums—non-participant observation or 




An Overview of the Chapters 
Chapter One has already set the stage for the study, by presenting the analytical 
framework. Chapter Two seeks to locate cyberspace in the context of Singapore, 
tracing the regulations imposed in the online world. Chapter Three fuses two different 
“entities” on the Internet and studies the nature and strategies of resistance in three 
websites: TalkingCock.com which deals with satirical humour, New Sintercom and 
TC, which offer alternative news and commentary pieces. Chapter Four then 
examines discussion forums, in particular, sgForums, Sammyboy.com’s Alfresco 
Coffee Shop and soc.culture.singapore.  It will be elucidated that what may be 
trivialised as petty complaints and sarcastic remarks made on these Internet forums 
are congruent to Scott’s notion of the “weapons of the weak”.132 Lastly, Chapter Five 
is a study on the emerging trend of blogs and the political impact of these blogs in 
terms of its capacity for political resistance.  
 
Limitations 
As this thesis examines the various strategies of resistance that take place in 
cyberspace within Singapore, two limitations are delineated. Firstly, to avoid losing 
focus, this study has excluded an extensive discussion of the inseparable issue of the 
digital divide, in which less affluent members of society cannot afford computers and 
are not equipped with the technical skills to utilise this “weapon” and engage in any 
acts of resistance on the Internet. More specifically, although states in general are 
incapable of effectively monitoring and censoring cyberspatial counter-discourse, this 
dissertation acknowledges that this particular means of resistance is open only to 
                                                
132 Scott, Weapons. 
 38 
those who have access to computers, modems, and the Internet.133 However, the focus 
of the dissertation is not in capturing the opinions of the entire populace, but rather, to 
study the significance of the Internet as a site in which the government and populace 
contest for hegemony. 
 Secondly, the attempt to discuss the Internet in Singapore is imprecise due to 
the global nature of cyberspace. This paper has therefore drawn the parameters of 
“Singaporean” matters on the Internet by identifying any online activity that deals 
with Singaporean political life. Thus, in this case study of Singapore, websites that are 
based overseas are also examined, regardless of whether they are within the 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Mission Impossible: Regulating Cyberspace 
 
This chapter provides the context in which the study of resistance on the Internet is 
pursued. By accounting for the conditions various strategies of resistance on the 
Internet emerge from, this chapter seeks to understand what is unique about the 
Internet and how it presents itself an alternate platform for resistance. It examines the 
particularities of state-society relations in Singapore, elucidating the extensive laws 
and institutions that the state employs to control speech and activities in the “real” and 
“virtual” world,  as well as “soft” restraints or OB markers that are in place that have 
elicited varying responses from netizens. 
 
The Dominance of the PAP 
Singapore has been labelled a “semi-authoritarian” regime, an “illiberal democracy” 
and a hegemonic party system by various scholars despite the holding of regular 
elections. Larry Diamond notes that Singapore is a “hybrid” regime, one that falls 
between liberal democracy and politically closed authoritarian regimes. Of these 
hybrid regime types, Singapore is categorised more specifically as a hegemonic party 
system, whereby  a “relatively institutionalized ruling party monopolizes the political 
arena, using coercion, patronage, media control, and other means to deny formally 
legal opposition parties any real chance of competing for power.134  
 A wide range of means are employed to impede any significant challenge to 
the ruling party. These included intimidation of political adversaries and critical 
elements of the media by invoking the Internal Security Act (ISA), under which 
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people can be held indefinitely without trial. However, the more pervasive aspects of 
authoritarianism in Singapore involve a sophisticated combination of legislation and 
political cooption to channel contention through state-controlled institutions.135 This 
has hampered the growth of a genuine civil society, thereby stifling PAP’s political 
opponents and blunting political pluralism. An elitist ideology rationalises the PAP’s 
political monopoly, depicting the government “as a technical process that must be the 
preserve of a meritocracy”.136 The government also holds rein on various para-
political institutions such as the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC), grassroots 
organisations,137 and even the local mainstream media. It is through these institutions 
that the party manages to sustain its support and dominance. 
 The state’s rationales for security paranoia and climate of control could be 
traced back to the historical backdrop of Singapore’s traumatic past just after colonial 
rule and during the merger with Malaysia. When self-government began in 1959, 
Singapore boasted a wide range of newspapers which were relatively free from 
government intrusion, allowing critical examination and scrutiny of public policies.138 
However, there was increased sensitivity to media reporting after the 1961 split in the 
ruling party that resulted in the establishment of the rival Barisan Nasional (National 
Front). This led to a new regime installed through a combination of pressures on 
editors and journalists and structural changes eroding the independence of media 
organisations.139  
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 There were many instances of media subversion that culminated in the state’s 
security paranoia. For many months during the Malaysian years, the Utusan Melayu, 
the Jawi script newspaper, was the main vehicle that carried anti-PAP messages to the 
Singapore Malays. It published increasingly inflammatory reports of PAP repression 
of Malay rights in Singapore and generally painted the party as the chief threat to the 
Malays of all Malaysia.140 In addition, The Straits Times branded the PAP as a 
ruthless and dictatorial communist organisation during Lee Kuan Yew’s fight against 
the procommunists and leftists in 1959. Lee, in turn, accused the newspapers as 
“blooming scoundrels”.141 These incidents had probably fuelled the leader's 
apprehension towards the independent media. 
Thus the PAP took calculated moves against such potentially politically 
antagonistic media. Almost immediately after taking power, the PAP amended the 
Printing Presses Ordinance, which required not just annual permits from the 
government for the printing and publication of the newspapers in Singapore, but also 
for the sale and distribution in Malaya of newspapers printed in Singapore. 142 These 
permits could be withdrawn without the government having to explain why.  
Being increasingly intimidated by the government through various means, 
editors and reporters began to understand the seriousness of official sensitivity to 
critical or investigative journalism. The ISA, a repressive legislation inherited from 
British colonial authorities, was exploited as one of these means. Besides providing 
for detention without trial of suspected threats to national security, it also allowed the 
relevant minister in Singapore to prohibit the printing, publication and sale, inter alia, 
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of subversive publications.143 This Act was employed in 1963 on PAP’s critics and 
adversaries in Operation Cold Store, involving the arrest of 111 people, including nine 
journalists from the Chinese, English and Malay-language print media.144  
In the early 1970s, the domestic media was still not as docile as then PM Lee 
Kuan Yew would have liked, despite the legal intimidation. He thus took further 
action to curb the potential for independent media to criticise the government.  
Besides targeting the Chinese language newspapers that had served a voice for ethnic 
Chinese who felt marginalised under the PAP’s English-educated, middle class 
leadership, Lee also aimed to bring down English-language newspapers that were 
occasionally critical of the government too.145 In a sequence of events in 1971, four 
editors of Nanyang Siang Pau were detained under the ISA, while the English-
language Eastern Sun and Singapore Herald were closed down due to their alleged 
links to foreign operatives that were either Communist or capitalists bent on 
undermining the Singapore economy.146 Subsequent amendments to the legislation of 
print media permitted the government to own newspapers and essential tightened 
controls over the ownership of the newspapers. 
 The early nineties saw a change in leadership and a transition towards the 
politics of consultation. During the 1980s, then Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong mooted for institutions which functioned as official feedback channels (such as 
the Feedback Unit) to be set up, as part of a more participative government. In 1991, 
then Brigadier-General George Yeo, Minister for Information and the Arts gave a 
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speech on civil society,147 identifying the PAP government as a “banyan tree” which 
did not allow other civil or civic institutions to grow in its daunting shade and had 
therefore to be pruned.148 During this period, the strength of civil society in 
influencing the political sphere seemed to be growing.  Civil society groups such as 
the Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE) and Nature Society of 
Singapore (NSS) were more active in their respective affairs. The former petitioned 
the government on a series of issues relating to gender equality and domestic 
violence, while the latter lobbied the government to adopt a Green Plan to conserve 
nature areas in the run-up to the 1992 Earth Summit at Rio,149 as well as successfully 
resisted plans by the government to develop a golf course in a nature area.150 
 However it can also be argued that PAP, in the name of opening up space for 
civil society, has also expanded its own space and rooting its ideological hegemony. 
Through the Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) scheme and the incorporation 
of wider community involvement in the Government Parliamentary Committees, 
individuals add particular expertise to the decision-making process on a non-
confrontational basis, rather than to represent any constituency.151 On the political 
parties’ front, key opposition figures such as Tang Liang Hong, JB Jeyaratnam and 
Chee Soon Juan continue to be targets of legal action by the PAP and have been 
crippled by lofty legal damages.  
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 The international press has also not been spared the harsh treatment. 
Amendments to the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act in 1986 gave the Minister of 
Communications and Information the capacity to restrict the circulation of foreign 
publications in Singapore that were deemed to be engaging in domestic politics.152 
The Asian Wall Street Journal, Asiaweek and Far Eastern Economist Review had 
their circulation significantly reduced after commenting unfavourably of the PAP and 
its politics. Further amendments in 1990 gripped foreign publications tighter to the 
jurisdiction of local courts, requiring them to secure an annual permit and deposit a 
substantial fixed bond toward any legal liabilities that might be incurred.153 After 
expensive losses of access to Singapore’s circulation and advertising markets, foreign 
publishers have generally been more cautious. However, the International Herald 
Tribune was filed with two expensive suits arising from different articles in 1994, 
charging sensitive issues such as PAP nepotism and the absence of judicial 
independence in Singapore.154 
  
OB Markers 
Despite the government’s rhetoric of “pruning the banyan tree”, civil society 
continued to operate within legal and “soft” constraints. The legal restrictions include 
the ISA and the Societies Act, with the former providing the Minister of Home 
Affairs the power to detain any individual who is suspected to be conducting activities 
that threaten the social fabric of the country, while the latter requires that all groups of 
more than ten persons meeting regularly should be formally registered with the 
Registrar of Societies, besides prohibiting registered organisations to engage in 
                                                




political activity and restricting their activities to cover only the issues relevant to 
their declared constituencies. 
 The ambiguous demarcation of “out-of-bound” (OB) markers is also part of 
Singapore’s political discourse, specifically relating to the government’s low 
threshold of political opposition. An often-cited account of the government’s 
intolerance of criticism is the “Catherine Lim Affair”, in which the government 
reacted strongly to Lim’s ruminations in The Straits Times on the difference in 
governing styles between Goh Chok Tong and Lee Kuan Yew. The government 
emphasised that there were “OB markers” for public discussion, in which the 
government welcomed constructive criticism while warning those who seemed to 
“take on” the government. The former PM, Goh, remarked that those who used snide 
remarks and mockery must expect a “very very hard blow from the Government in 
return”155 and explained that he could not allow journalists, novelists, short-story 
writers of theatre groups to “set the political agenda from outside the political 
arena”.156 Lim was therefore told to join a political party if she felt strongly about the 
issues she raised. This affair was perceived by the general citizenry as a warning from 
the government, about the topics on what they could or could not talk about. A similar 
case happened several years later, involving a popular blogger and his column in the 
mainstream media, which is discussed in Chapter Five. 
 This ambiguous code of conduct not only has implications on the perception 
of the citizens, but also the mass media, in which journalists and editors, who play a 
major role in shaping public opinion, are hesitant on taking risks to speak against 
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government policies, thus explaining the limited political commentary on local 
politics in the mainstream media. It is therefore not surprising that the official national 
ideology, known as “Shared Values”, discourage criticism and general dissent. One of 
the ideas include “consensus, not contention”, which are supposed to be perceived as 
antagonistic concepts. This view is based on the rhetoric that the profusion of 
opinions may hinder policy making, and that contention might lead to a chaotic 
society, given a multi-cultural backdrop that demands sensitivity and toleration.  
 These OB markers apply not only to speech, but also other forms of 
expression. For instance, some “white elephant” cut-outs were placed at the 
Buangkok MRT station in August 2005, a creative attempt to demonstrate 
unhappiness over the delay in opening of the station. The grassroots leader behind this 
“light” form of dissent was issued a stern warning from the police. The following 
January, a group of secondary school students were inspired by this incident to sell 
“save the white elephants” T-shirts at a carnival to celebrate the station’s opening. To 
the astonishment of many, they were also warned by the police that they needed a 
fund-raising permit before they could sell the T-shirts in public. Furthermore, the 
police advised the organisers that the wearing of the T-shirts en masse may be 
misconstrued by some as an offence under the Miscellaneous Offences (Public and 
Order and Nuisance) (Assemblies and Processions) Rules.157 This incident seemed to 
account for the unsuccessful attempts of similar (silent) “demonstrations”, and 
reinforces the “culture of fear” and silence that pervades the average Singaporean.  
 In light of these legal and informal restrictions, civil society associations are 
restrained in their attempts to offer alternate voices and critique of governance. 
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Through major agents of socialisation such as schools and the media, students and the 
populace in general are trained not to question authority. Consequently, people do not 
speak publicly for fear of real or imagined repercussions, including being blacklisted 
by authorities. It is thus interesting to examine the Internet as a site for the hidden 
transcript, as a source of alternate voices, constructive criticism, as well as a “safer” 
public sphere where the authorities have less penetration and authority over, and 
where people are generally more daring in terms of political expression. According to 
the Media Development Authority (MDA), “Internet Content Providers are not 
disallowed from discussing politics or social issues. However, the laws of the land 
will continue to apply.”158  
 
Cyberspace: An Alternative Space 
The Singapore government, which has long controlled its local print and broadcast 
media, has invested billions in its Internet infrastructure to become an “intelligent 
island”. The government in its bid to embrace new advances in information 
technology has upgraded information technology infrastructure to facilitate the 
creation of a network society. This has inevitably developed a relatively 
technologically-savvy population, and cyberspace can be seen as an alternate public 
sphere that could change the dynamics of Singapore politics. However, cyberspace is 
yet another arena in which the state attempts to dominate with the means of laws and 
“soft” restraints. 
 While one can be sued for making racists and libellous remarks, both on- and 
offline, under the Sedition and Defamation Acts respectively, no netizen has got into 
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trouble because of strictly “political” comments, and this is despite the many blogs, 
forums and other websites filled with provocative, critical commentaries, and 
sometimes even libellous entries about Singapore politicians, parties and policies.159 
In the last two years, political blogs have become regular features at elections in the 
US, UK and Australia and have arguably played a part in the 2006 GE in Singapore. 
 In the past decade, Internet-based organizations such as Sintercom were seen 
as contributing to a re-emerging civil society. This momentum was kept up when 
more initiatives such as TC and Singapore Window presented independent news and 
public forums that gave Singaporeans a chance to read and express criticism of 
government policies and actions within a domestic online environment. These sites 
exploited a grey area in the regulations, operating on the basis that such sites had not 
been specifically forbidden. Satirical website TalkingCock.com parodies politics in 
Singapore, while online newsgroups like Singapore Review and alternative websites 
such as New Sintercom, The Void Deck, Singaporeans for Democracy and Littlespeck 
put up critical and investigative articles, focusing on local social and political issues, 
materials that would not be published in the Singapore press because of the risk of 
legal repercussion.  
 The Internet has indeed expanded the scope for the expression of political 
views, and the convenient dissemination of, and access to, information and even 
resistance. Additionally, these sites have been relatively safe spaces to voice dissent 
as opposed to publicly articulated views that are systematically challenged as in the 
case of the “Catherine Lim affair”. The advent of the Internet has also seemed to 
present a new reality for the ruling party because the easy access to alternative sources 
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of information effectively mitigates the ideological hegemony that the PAP enjoys. 
Although legal and administrative measures have been taken to control the space for 
civil society and to hinder political mobilisation, the PAP’s strategy to limit the 
political impact of the Internet is severed by the fact that it is technically impossible to 
monitor all websites. In establishing the “Speaker’s Corner”, the authorities are aware 
that this was something that they have to confront, since there have been many of 
such virtual corners in cyberspace. 
 
Policing Cyberspace 
The Internet has not escaped the unyielding grip of the PAP and is regulated just like 
the mainstream media. As George Yeo opined, “Censorship can no longer be 100 
percent effective, but even if it is only 20 percent effective, we should not stop 
censoring.”160 The Singapore Broadcasting Authority (SBA) is in charge of regulating 
the Internet, concentrating on areas that may undermine public morals, political 
stability or religious harmony in Singapore.161 Besides the symbolic banning of about 
a hundred pornographic sites, the government has stated that the Internet will stay 
open. However, there is evidence to suggest that such claims should be re-examined.  
 Rodan notes that the most powerful force for self-censorship is possibly 
through the technical capacity for surveillance through government-owned Internet 
access service providers (ISPs).162  In 1994, a government official instructed a local 
ISP to scan 80,000 e-mail accounts of university lecturers, supposedly in a hunt for 
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pornographic materials.163 This demonstration of technical capability to search files 
on such a large scale does have an alarming effect, even after the government stated 
that it did not intend any further unannounced searches. Rodan also notes that even a 
special police task force had been assigned to “patrol the alleys of cyberspace to 
contain illegal activities”.164 In May 1999, the IT Security Unit of Singapore’s 
Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) secretly wandered into the files of 200,000 private 
computers. This breach was discovered by a private computer enthusiast, which 
obligated the government to announce that SingNet, the Internet arm of the largely 
state-owned telecommunications giant SingTel, had breached security protocols,165 
although the latter explained that it was a virus detection exercise.166  
 These episodes and the regulatory regime of the SBA display the need for 
caution for critical political engagement. Rodan highlights self-censorship as the main 
technique of control, rather than “technical interceptions or extensive 
prosecutions”.167 He draws attention to the culture of fear already existent on 
cyberspace and illustrates that with a case of a contributor of soc.culture.singapore 
who voiced his concern his personal experience of being under close surveillance by 
the authorities, especially because of his job as a civil servant. Rodan is convinced 
that such claims are difficult to authenticate, but what matters more is the impact 
these messages have on other users and even suggests that it is possible that some 
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claims are fabricated by or on behalf of authorities with the aim of creating 
apprehension and promoting self-censorship.168  
 Regulations add pressure to practise self-censorship at all levels—from the 
Internet user to the ISPs. The 1996 regulations stipulate that firstly, local Internet 
Service operators and content providers will have to be licensed and subject to SBA-
imposed conditions.169 Secondly, all political parties, religious organizations, and 
other organizations and individuals with Web pages discussing religion or politics 
must register with the SBA.170 Thirdly, service providers must take action to prevent 
the availability of “objectionable content” which threatens public and national 
defense, racial and religious harmony, and public morals. This includes “contents 
which tend to bring the Government into hatred or contempt, or which excite 
disaffection against the Government” and “contents which undermine the public 
confidence in the administration of justice.”171 The SBA will supply information on 
blacklisted sites, but ISPs will need to also exercise judgement in the provision of 
subscription services. The use of proxy servers is required of commercial Internet 
access service providers, while public providers are required to connect with the 
proxy server and install software to restrict access to objectionable content.172 
Fourthly, licensees are required to provide details on readers targeted by their service; 
the names of editors, publishers, and organizations involved in the service; and keep 
detailed records on subscribers and their Internet use to assist with investigations.173 
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Finally, electronic newspapers targeting subscriptions in Singapore must be registered 
and subject to local media laws under the Newspapers and Printing Presses Act.174  
 The other laws such as the Penal Code, Defamation Act, Sedition Act and 
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act apply as well. Rodan also attributes the 
amendments to the Parliamentary Elections Act, which had implications to both 
political party websites and non-party political associations’ websites, to the PAP’s 
worry that the Internet facilitate competition with the ruling party by enabling critics 
to get around the dominance of the government-controlled domestic media and “the 
potential of the Internet to foster a genuine civil society by challenging the officially 
enforced compartmentalization of political engagement and by facilitating collective 
political action”.175 
 The spirit of the Societies Act has been integrated into legislation and 
regulations affecting the Internet. The regulations in place include the requirement for 
websites of political parties and religious organizations to be registered and licensed. 
Rodan highlights an observation made by local journalist Koh Buck Song that the 
regulations “have a much more explicit party-political component in calling for 
protecting the security and stability of the ‘government’ as opposed to the 
‘nation’”.176 The barring of content that “tends to bring the Government into hatred or 
contempt, or excites disaffection against it” could “grant unchecked—possibly 
uncheckable power to the ruling body to deny any criticism of it on the Internet”.177 
The extent of the control includes penalties applied at various levels of information 
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provision and authorship such as Internet service provision and newsgroup hosting 
and legislation that are open to wide interpretation.178  
 The fate of Fateha.com was an example of how overstepping political 
boundaries in private internet postings constituted a real risk. In July 2002, the police 
investigated Zulfikar Mohamad Shariff, the former chief of the Singapore Muslim 
rights activist website on the grounds of criminal defamation. In early 2002, Zulfikar 
questioned the government’s actions in denying the rights of Muslim girls to wear 
their tudung (traditional headscarves) to schools. Although this incident was 
particularly sensitive in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the 
uncovering of the Jemaah Islamiah terrorist plot in Singapore in January 2002, the 
investigation seemed to have more to do with political annoyance rather than a social 
threat.179 Zulfikar was also under investigation for articles posted on the website 
questioning Muslim Affairs Minister Yaacob Ibrahim’s standing as leader of the 
Malay/Muslim community, and criticising the appointment of Ho Ching (the wife of 
present-PM Lee) as Executive Director of Temasek Holdings.180 The probes 
intensified the next day when the police confiscated the computer of another man, 
Robert Ho, for two articles that appeared in June 2002 in soc.culture.singapore, a 
popular internet newsgroup. The articles allegedly defamed government leaders and 
officials.181 
 The cases of Fateha, Sintercom and the TC (which are examined in Chapter 
Three), exemplify the pressures towards moderation and self-censorship on the 
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Internet. The Foucauldian notion of “discipline” and auto-regulation due to the 
Internet as surveillance and policing technology, embodying the key elements of the 
panopticon, explain the political reality in the Singapore context.182 It is argued by 
Lee that “the Internet in Singapore is a highly contested space where the art of 
governmentality, in the forms of informational controls and ‘automatic’ modes of 
regulation, is tried, tested and subsequently perfected.”183  
[T]he major effect of the Panopticon [is] to induce in the inmate a state of conscious 
and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to 
arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is 
discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its 
actual exercise unnecessary. […] It is an important mechanism, for it automizes and 
disindividualizes power.184 
 
Thus, it seems that “auto-regulation, as a disciplinary tactic to ensure a panoptical, 
and thus automatic, functioning of power and control” allows for the “formation and 
operation” of what Lee calls “gestural politics” in Singapore185: although citizens are 
encouraged to embrace the Singapore 21 vision with regards to becoming active 
citizens, and although a Speakers’ Corner had been opened up, citizens are 
periodically issued stern warnings about “OB-markers and other state-defined 
conditions”.186 Thus it is necessary to analyse the climate of auto-regulation, and 
whether it pervades the various entities of the Internet and if the “concept of 
technological auto-regulation that is conducted both ‘visibly’ and ‘unverifiably’ with 
regard to the Internet in Singapore [that] hinges on an ideology of control with the 
sole aim of producing law-abiding, self-regulated and therefore economically 
productive, docile and compliant citizens”187 has been effective. 
                                                
182 Lee, “Internet Control”. 
183 Ibid., 74. 
184 Foucault, 201-202. 
185 Lee, “Politics of Civil Society”, 110. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Lee, “Internet Control”, 86. 
 55 
   
Elections and the Internet: “New Media, Same Rules”188 
 The government has also taken notice of the Internet as a potential vote-
swaying arena. It recognises that the Internet enables critics to get around the 
dominance of the government-controlled domestic media and worries about the 
potential of the Internet to foster a genuine civil society in terms of facilitating 
collective political action.189 
 Internet election advertising was allowed for the first time during the GE2001, 
but it was restricted only to political parties, candidates and election agents. A 
“positive list” set out the types of election advertising allowed. They were allowed to 
carry texts, such as party manifestos, candidates’ write-ups and photos on their 
websites. However, the amendments of 2001 to the Parliamentary Elections Act 
banned the use of the Internet by political parties for any posting of opinion poll 
results and required the appointment of moderators to chat rooms and discussion 
forums who had to keep records of all exchanges and accept responsibility of 
content.190 The amendments also barred websites of registered non-party political 
associations and all other websites from political promotion, advertising, or 
campaigning during elections, meaning that neither public nor private interest groups 
could use the Internet to support or oppose any candidate or party.   
 In 2006, further regulations were stipulated, including an update concerning 
the proliferation of podcasts. Dr Lee Boon Yang, Minister for Information, 
Communications and the Arts, stated that those deemed to be promoting a certain 
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political line will be approached by the MDA to register their sites with authorities, 
and would subsequently not be allowed to engage in Internet advertising during the 
election period.191 This means that they cannot put up material related to the election 
that purveys a particular line. Neither can they have podcasts or videocasts containing 
content such as election rallies or views on the polls. Lee explained that the rationale 
for registration is that “political debate ought to be kept serious and those who 
participate in it must take responsibility and cannot remain anonymous. He added that 
podcasts192 and videocasts are banned as “they have a greater impact because of the 
nature of the medium”, that they have “a greater power to influence”. 193 It is for the 
same reason that party political films and videos are not allowed as there is a worry 
that such material may masquerade as objective documentaries, but are in fact 
“slanted propaganda to draw attention and score political points”.194 Lee explained 
that “such videos cannot be easily countered with rational written arguments” and that 
they “evoke visceral emotions and are not conducive to a calm and dispassionate 
treatment of politics”.195 He used the film Fahrenheit 9/11 in “its selective use of 
images and out-of-context quotations”196 to exemplify this point. These reasons are 
among those that the state evokes to perpetuate the idea of the Internet as irrational, 
chaotic and unreliable. These claims will be examined closely in the Chapters Three 
to Five. 
 The rules also are quite vague, as it is not clear how the line between 
discussion and “persistent propagation” of a political message are drawn. According 
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to Senior Minister of State for Information, Communications and the Arts Dr. Balaji 
Sadasivan, bloggers can discuss politics but have to register their site if they 
“persistently propagate, promote or circulate political issues relating to Singapore”.197 
It will be subsequently shown in the next few chapters how netizens harp on the term 
“persistently political” with reference to his statements. Some bloggers also claim that 
their views do not incite political fervour and found it not necessary to register their 
blogs198 while many defied the rules blatantly. Despite the ban, SDP chief Chee Soon 
Juan uploaded a podcast of a speech criticizing the PAP for “going all out to crush the 
SDP” onto his party’s website, claiming that the Government had banned podcasting 
“knowing full well” that the SDP had set up podcast facilities last year to campaign 
for GE2006.199 The new ban on new media has significantly highlighted a glaring 
contradiction in the PAP's policy rhetoric and its on-the-ground actions. Recent policy 
initiatives have aimed, at least conceptually, to promote creativity, yet the state has 
imposed more measures to stifle expression to further its own interests. The next 
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The notion that there is a widespread culture of apathy and a lack of strategies of 
resistance in Singapore must be reconsidered upon examining the vast array of 
websites that offer alternative news, socio-political commentary pieces and satire that 
the mainstream press shies away from. This chapter explores the various modes of 
counter-hegemonic resistance in these alternative web sites, focusing on 
TalkingCock.com, New Sintercom and TC. In monitoring the activity of these websites 
around the electoral campaigning period, this paper traces online discourse and the 
dynamics of resistance between citizen and state. 
 However, in order to better analyse such Internet activity in relation to 
GE2006, it would certainly be useful to understand the nature of Singapore’s 
elections, as well as its unique electoral procedures, and specific incidents that 
transpired during and surrounding the election period.200 
 
Singapore Political Elections 
 The PAP has maintaied its political dominance by developing voter support 
through effective administration and sound economic policies, and through 
manipulating the electoral framework—by intimidating organised political opposition, 
and by circumscribing the boundaries of legitimate political discourse and action. As 
a consequence of these and other factors, opposition parties have been unable to 
tangibly challenge the ruling party—and this lack of resistance has been attributed by 
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the PAP to disorganisation, weak leadership amongst opposition ranks, and lack of 
persuasive alternative policies.  
 Singapore holds regular elections and adopts a first-past-the-post electoral 
system. The parliamentary term lasts for no more than five years after the first sitting 
of parliament following a general election. However, the lack of opposition can also 
be traced to various electoral rules and procedures that can be construed as favouring 
the incumbent. These include: short notice given about periodic changes to electoral 
seats within Group Representative Constituencies (GRCs); frequent changes to the 
boundaries separating constituencies by the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee 
effectively disadvantaging the opposition; the ruling that a hefty deposit of S$13,500 
must be paid for a candidate to stand for elections, a sum which most disadvantaged 
opposition members might be unable to pay (the sum will be forfeited if the candidate 
fails to obtain at least one-eighth of the votes); the abrupt one-week period allowed 
for electoral campaigning, which does not allow sufficient time for the opposition to 
extend their reach to the masses; the formation of large GRCs, which allows new 
candidates to rely on political “heavyweights” such as Minister Mentor (MM) Lee, 
Senior Minister (SM) Goh and PM Lee to anchor the group’s win (with their limited 
resources and candidates, opposition parties have a slightly better chance of winning 
seats from Single Member Constituencies (SMCs) than GRCs—GRCs are usually 
constituencies with walkovers). 
 A few significant events stand out in GE2006. In February, PM Lee delivered 
the country’s Budget statement, releasing details of a S$2.6 billion on a “progress 
package” to be given out a week before the GE2006 (the package included Central 
Provident Fund (CPF) top-ups, workfare bonuses and bonuses for national 
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servicemen). Opposition candidates such as WP’s Low Thia Kiang construed this as a 
vote-winning ploy by the PAP, a charge which the latter dismissed.201 This incentive 
did not seem to be effective however, because for the first time since 1988, the PAP 
was not returned to power from walkovers on Nomination Day, and the opposition 
contested for more than half of the total amount of seats. 
 The James Gomez saga also stood out during the elections period. Gomez, a 
WP candidate, claimed that the Elections Department had misplaced a set of forms he 
had submitted a few days earlier. The forms were vital in certifying him as a minority 
candidate if he was to stand in a ward that required one. After claiming that they did 
not receive the forms, the Elections Department released CCTV footage to the media 
of evidence that Gomez did not submit the forms, but had instead placed them in his 
bag. This footage was subsequently televised repeatedly by the mainstream media 
during the elections period and despite apologising to the staff of the Elections 
Department, the PAP went on the offensive, with the MM Lee calling him a liar and 
other PAP candidates following suit in highlighting the matter to the media. 
 Another incident that raised eyebrows amongst the opposition as well as 
netizens, was the National Kidney Foundation (NKF) scandal. The NKF controversy 
started in 2005 following the collapse of a defamation trial brought against journalist 
Susan Long and Singapore Press Holdings (SPH). This caused a massive backlash 
and fallout with donors to the charity, subsequently resulting in the resignation of 
Chief Executive Officer T.T. Durai and its board of directors. Allegations surrounding 
the scandal included false declarations on the shelf life of NKF's reserves, its patient 
numbers, an alleged installation of a golden tap in Durai's private office suite, his 
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salary, the use of company cars and first-class air travel. Former NKF patron Tan 
Choo Leng, wife of SM Goh, sparked further outrage when she remarked that Durai's 
pay of S$600,000 per annum was “peanuts”. 
 The upgrading of public housing, including the Lift Upgrading Programme 
(LUP), was another major issue during GE2006. The PAP had tied the scheduling of 
housing upgrades to the number of votes the party received in the election, arguing 
that those who supported its various policies, including upgrading, should be given 
priority. In hotly-contested wards such as Aljunied GRC, Potong Pasir and Hougang 
SMCs, upgrading seemed to be a carrot dangled by the PAP. This was taken up as an 
issue by opposition parties in their campaign speeches. 
 With this context in mind, the next section and subsequent two chapters will 
analyse the modes in which citizens have taken to the Internet to practise “everyday 
forms of resistance”, with textual evidence being provided of such “weapons of the 
weak”—strategies and tactics that Singaporean netizens employ to overcome 
regulations imposed to stifle dissent. These chapters thus illustrate the Gramscian 
“war of position” at play whereby citizens who practise such forms of resistance are 
trying to manoeuvre the battlefield, exploiting weaknesses in the opposition camp, to 
win the war. 
 
TalkingCock.com: Not Just “Talking Cock”202 
TalkingCock.com, was founded in 2000 by husband-and-wife team Colin Goh and 
Woo Yen Yen “as a forum for friends to share jokes with each other”.203 It has since 
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then “garnered millions of page views and a subscribership in the tens of 
thousands”.204 This US-based website prides itself as “Singapore’s most powderful205 
satirical humour website”, and serves an “alternative” source of information, albeit in 
a tongue-in-cheek manner. Besides providing local and international “news” articles 
with irreverent twists that seek to make fun of Singaporean society and politics in a 
genial way, there are columns and other features such as the “Coxford Singlish 
Dictionary”, a compilation of words that have been used in “Singlish”, a colloquial 
fusion of Chinese dialects, Malay and other languages. 
 One obvious and unique feature of this website is the use of Singlish in 
“quoted” material. The use of Singlish has been a controversial topic in the past 
decade, and the state has sought to promote Standard English despite recognising the 
prominence of Singlish in shaping national identity. The Coxford Singlish Dictionary, 
a lexicon of Singapore's vernacular English, is thus seen as the anti-thesis to the 
state’s agenda of discouraging Singlish because it is regarded as grammatically 
unsound, crass, and crudely put, a bastardization of Standard English. The state has 
advanced the argument that Singlish is a stumbling block to proper communication 
with non-Singlish-speaking foreigners, and its continued use will ultimately 
disadvantage Singapore economically. It is therefore to no surprise that some articles 
featured on the website, parody local politics and politicians from both of the ruling 
party and opposition, and are often written in Singlish, a blatant retort to state 
directives. 
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 TalkingCock.com maintains that it is not a political website, but that is highly 
disputable. By sometimes using crude humour to convey ideas, and by distorting or 
fabricating names of mocked personalities, the website cleverly employs humour for 
legal protection. Although many prominent personalities have been parodied, this 
website has not been subjected to any state penalty. While the people behind the 
website “believe in freedom of expression and celebrating the uniqueness of 
Singaporeans”, and aim to “build a community of Singaporeans with a sense of 
humour and who enjoy life in all its complexity” by writing articles “which poke fun 
at local events and happenings”, they claim not to be writing mere nonsense for 
“satire is always rooted in reality”.206 They do, however, take pains to explain how 
TalkingCock.com is not a political website as “it has no political agenda of its own”, 
and argue that it is “only” satirical, “engag[ing] in social comment through the use of 
biting humour”, which may sometimes include commenting on politics.207 The 
website states: 
1. Under the Singapore Constitution, citizens have the right to freedom of expression. 
2. The content in TalkingCock is not of the sort that justifies abridging this fundamental 
right under the Constitution.  It does not threaten Singapore's national security, 
foreign relations, public order or morality, and it is ludicrous to believe it does or 
ever will. Nor is it defamatory as our articles are clearly stated to be purely fictitious 
and humourous and not to be relied on. Frivolity and irreverence are not illegal, and a 
citizen has no legal right not to be outraged or offended.” 
3. If any site with any political content is considered 'political', then all newspaper sites 
are also political. And if sites like TalkingCock or Sintercom are regulated, so should 
the Straits Times, The New Paper, Project Eyeball and Young PAP. 
4. We believe the citizens of Singapore are now intelligent enough to cast their votes on 
the basis of issues, and not uncorroborated rumour.  In any event, it should be the 
duty of political parties to address issues or rumours rather than seeking 
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 It is thus apparent that the editors understand that they cannot be prosecuted 
for they are within the “safety zones” of humour, fiction, frivolity and irreverence. 
The employment of legal terms to argue against censorship and regulation of the 
website, parallels Kevin O’Brien’s notion of “rightful resistance” in which the editors 
employ “rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to curb political or economic 
power” with  “the innovative use of laws, policies, and other officially promoted 
values to defy “disloyal” political and economic elites”; using “recognized principles 
to apply pressure on those in power who have failed to live up to some professed ideal 
or who have not implemented some beneficial measure.”209  
 In other words, rightful resistance works when the editors make “legitimate” 
claims, appealing to the ruling elites through invoking official laws, regulations, or 
policies. They usually frame their claims with reference to government rhetoric and 
since they often demand little more than meticulous enforcement of existing 
commitments, theirs is a defiance based on strict adherence to established values.210 
The owners of the website frame their activities (of contention) by combining legal 
tactics with political pressure. Rightful resisters assert their claims “largely through 
approved channels and use [the] regime’s policies and legitimating myths to justify 
their defiance”, recognising that “the very symbols embraced by those in power can 
be a source of entitlement, inclusion, and empowerment”.211 This reiterates the 
Gramscian notion that subordinate groups challenging hegemony frequently draw 
from their arsenal of dominant discourses, being “structured” by the dominant 
ideology. 
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 Despite the strong belief in freedom of expression, TalkingCock.com decided 
that it was too “chicken-hearted” and announced that it was “taking no chances” and 
that it would not “persistently propagate, promote or circulate” any “explicit political 
content” during the election period following the announcement.212 However, they 
add a disclaimer: 
But as ‘explicit political content’ is open to wide interpretation…,213 and the 
Gahmen214 is probably too busy to clarify exactly what it means, we ask for our 
readers’ cooperation. Tolong,215 tolong, when you read our stuff—which we have to 
remind you is completely frivolous, made-up nonsense that you should absolutely 
NOT rely on when casting your vote—PLEASE DO NOT BELIEVE, DEBATE OR 
DISCUSS IT. Do exactly what the Gahmen says. It’s safer.216 
 
This acts as an “escape clause” whereby it is made obvious that the articles are 
entirely fictional, and should not affect the citizens’ voting choices in GE2006, and 
thus should not be construed as a threat to the ruling party. 
 Although the website posted many satirical articles pertaining to the elections 
before and after the election campaigning week, there was almost no sign of any 
dissenting articles against the ruling party during the campaigning week itself. 
However, one fictitious news report surfaced to poke fun at James Gomez’s 
negligence in handing up the minority candidate forms217 and touched on the 
unfairness of the elections. The story depicted the National University of Singapore 
(NUS) launching a minor programme in form-filling for political science majors, 
insinuating that the elections entailed massive amounts of bureaucratic paperwork; 
                                                
212 This is in reference to Senior Minister of State for Information, Communications and the Arts, 
Balaji Sadasivan’s comments on the Internet rules on election advertising as elaborated in the previous 
chapter. 
213 Referring to a real photo of Balaji Sadasivan, the Senior Minister of State for Information, 
Communications and the Arts, and a doctored picture of Sadasivan’s face superimposed on a body clad 
only in swimming trunks. 
214 “Gahmen” is an intentional misspelling of the word “government”. 
215 Malay word for “please” or “help”. 
216 “Talking Cock to Chicken Out During Elections”, TalkingCock.com, 23 April 2006, 
<http://www.talkingcock.com/html/article.php?sid=1932> (31 May 2006). 
217 See chapter 2 which elaborates the background to this episode. 
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and a Masters programme in Elections Engineering, implying that there was unfair 
competition in the elections: 
Prof. Wah explained that students who minor in Form Filling will take courses that 
cover the ins and outs of Political Donation Forms, Minority Community Status 
Forms, Certificates of Eligibility, Rally Site Booking Forms, Nomination Forms, 
Presidential Election Forms, Rally Speech Permits, and Permits to Apply for Permits 
(PAP).218 
 
 “Prof. Wah also hinted that NUS would soon launch a Masters in Political Science 
(Elections Engineering) to cater to postgraduate students who intend to play an active 
role in organizing elections. Pork-barrel Politics, Gerrymandering, Internet Elections 
Advertising, Defamation Law, Formulating Complicated Elections Procedures, 
Misplacing Submitted Election Forms, and Creating Pointless Forms (CPF) are 
among the courses that are likely to be offered. Our postgraduate programme is of 
first-world standard. Nobody teaches this kind of thing anywhere else in the world," 
said Prof. Wah as he gave reporters a wide smile.”219 
 
 
 After polling day, the articles poured in with full force. In a “post-election 
round up”, there was an attempt to poke fun at the “good” mandate that the PAP had 
garnered. “Pak Cham Kai” reported that the Ministry of Education had lowered the 
‘A1’ grade from 75 marks to 66.6 marks, poking fun at the 8.7% drop in PAP’s vote 
to 66.6%, with Lee Hsien Loong, fighting his first election as PM, as compared to the 
GE2001 when Goh Chok Tong was PM. This mocking obviously was in reference to 
the significant drop despite PM Lee’s declaration that the percentage was “good”. The 
article also went on to “quote” Minister of Education “Tarzan Shanmugaratnam” 
(referring to Minister of Education Tharman Shanmugaratnam) as saying that “one of 
the complaints we kept hearing from citizens was how tough our exam system is and 
how everything in life depends on our exam results… [thus we have] decided that 
whoever scores 66.6 marks will be considered to have scored a distinction instead of a 
mediocre B3 grade like before”.220 
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 Satire was also evident in a “certainly not persistently political” Bollywood 
script proposal that made reference to the NKF issue, as well as the progress 
package.221 The “arts” section also parodied the elections drama by concocting a 
fictitious Chinese opera or “wayang”, The Dragon Stomps Again.222 The opera related 
how the 83-year old emperor was surrounded by “obedient technocrats who [wrote] 
nice flowery scrolls but [had] no experience in battle”—a statement possibly alluding 
to the fact that some PAP ministers were in wards that were not contested and thus, 
did not have to go through the rite of passage of elections. The “wayang” went on to 
depict a court filled with “82 eunuchs” who were whipped into submission and “two 
token noblemen” who were “allowed occasional appearances of independence as long 
as they [did] not stray into [sic] beyond the emperor dictates”—a plot that in essence 
made fun of the fact that the Singaporean cabinet was filled with ministers controlled 
by the party whip, with only two token NCMPs who were politically constrained 
 PM Lee’s inappropriate use of the word “fix” in a rally speech was also taken 
up in cyberspace. A fictitious article surfaced soon after, reporting that Parliament had 
proposed a pay rise for the PM to enable him to multitask after he complained that he 
was unable to formulate policies if he had to think about fixing the opposition and 
buying supporters’ votes.223 This article based was based on a rally speech made by 
the PM on 3 May 2006, where he said: 
Suppose you had 10, 15, 20 opposition members in Parliament. Instead of spending 
my time thinking what is  the right policy for Singapore, I'm going to spend all my 
                                                                                                                                       
<http://www.talkingcock.com/html/article.php?sid=1945> (10 May 2006). 
221 “Chicken Little’, “Bollywood Script Discovered in Taxi in Singapore”, TalkingCock.com, 7 May 
2006,  
<http://www.talkingcock.com/html/article.php?sid=1942> (10 May 2006). 
222 “Chicken Little”, “Wayang Set for Repeat Performance in 2011”, TalkingCock.com, 7 May 2006, 
<http://www.talkingcock.com/html/article.php?sid=1944> ( 21 May 2006). 
223 “Nyonya Kway, “PM to Get Pay Raise to Help Him Multitask”, TalkingCock.com, 21 May 2006, 
<http://www.talkingcock.com/html/article.php?sid=1956> (30 May 2006). Emphasis added. 
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time thinking what's the right way to fix them, to buy my supporters[’] votes, how 
can I solve this week's problem and forget about next year's challenges?224 
 
The report went on to quote a fictitious character, the PM’s spokesman, who was 
trying to gather support for the PM by giving additional justifications for the increase 
in pay: to “buy supporters’ votes”, “hire staff to fix his opponents” and to “hire staff 
to fix any of his Freudian statements like using the word “fix” instead of “counter” 
(this was obviously a jibe at PM Lee’s press secretary who had previously issued a 
statement saying that he meant “counter” instead of the “direct language” of “fix”).225 
 References to other issues were also encapsulated in this short “report”, such 
as the Ministers’ high salaries and their constant increments, the state’s policies on  
“foreign talent”, dispensing election “sweeteners” to buy votes, and the ruling party’s 
unsavoury tactics towards the opposition. There is no doubt that the constant 
reference to key words like “fix” and “buying votes” will resonate in readers’ minds 
and that the ruling party’s excessive methods in dealing with the opposition will be 
internalised by the reader to some extent. 
 It is thus evident that political satires function well as a less-than-aggressive, 
albeit exaggerated, commentary tools, enabling people to convey sentiments and 
viewpoints effectively, and to speak about “taboo” issues. In the narration of 
abovementioned “absurd” stories, the hidden message of the ruling party’s double 
standards and its harassment of the opposition is revealed, and this strategy is 
effective because of the play made on the word “political”: the editors behind the 
website claim that the website is merely a satirical website and has no political agenda 
                                                
224 Sharon Tong, “PM Lee says countries worldwide respect and admire Singapore’s proven system” 
Channel NewsAsia, 3 May 2006. 
<http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/206313/1/.html> (10 May 2006).    
225 “PM Lee Clarifies Words Used At Lunchtime Rally: Press Secretary” Channel NewsAsia, 5 May 
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of its own, and yet, the parodies of personalities and the mockery of policies serve as 
political critique and resistance.   
 This strategy also works because it taps into pervading state rhetoric that if 
something is entertaining and frivolous, it is not to be taken seriously and it does not 
need to be addressed. Tactical prudence ensures that TalkingCock.com does not blurt 
out its hidden transcript overtly, but through the employment of humour and 
“dispelling” the importance of satire, they imply the sentiment that they are grudging 
conscripts to the performance. The state also appears to concede this pocket of space 
that resists it, since it relegates humour to entertainment and deems it of little political 
value. TalkingCock.com has managed to publish its satirical articles without becoming 
blocked and perhaps on the official transcript, its plea to the authorities has worked: 
We urge the government to act with restraint as regulation of speech invariably 
restricts plurality of debate and will hamper the creation of an environment where 
citizens engage in dynamic and creative thought. It also makes us look very cock on 
the international stage, and unbecoming of a global, 21st century metropolis. 
The government has had a stellar record of economic achievement, and we hope they 
will match this in the social arena by demonstrating the tolerance of opinion and 
diversity that makes nations great, and not merely rich.226 
 
 The war of position seems to be enacted here: by alluding to government 
rhetoric of transforming Singapore into a creative global city, and by praising the 
record of the PAP and even by emphasising that they are not partisan in their satire as 
they also make fun of the Opposition, TalkingCock.com seems to have won this 
pocket of space, to the extent that state has not sought to take over this space. 
However, to ensure its long-term survival, TalkingCock.com has taken the side of 
caution, and during the election week it abstained from publishing more satirical 
articles, demonstrating that they are grudging conscripts to the performance. 
                                                
226 TalkingCock.com, 
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TalkingCock.com has been successful employing this strategy of humour and caution, 
knowing that any clampdown will be detrimental to its survival and thus 
TalkingCock.com can be seen as a strategic site between the public and hidden 
transcript where individuals can insinuate resistance in disguised forms.  
 
The Reincarnation of Sintercom 
An examination of the Singapore Internet Community, or Sintercom, reveals that the 
strategy of hosting websites overseas seems to grant it immunity. Sintercom was 
started in 1994 by Tan Chong Kee, who was based in Stanford at that juncture. He 
wanted to start “an independent forum for Singaporeans … who did not find the 
country’s newspapers and broadcasters sufficiently reflective of the full range of 
public opinion”.227 Tan did not start out intending to exploit the internet’s potential for 
evading authority, rather, it was a regulatory loophole that allowed Tan and his 
collaborators to publish legally without a license.228 The editors did not hesitate to 
relocate the site from overseas campuses to Singapore when the opportunity arose, 
secured allies within the administrative elite to further their cause, and were even 
showcased on the official national homepage, Singapore Infomap.229 The editors also 
forged links with other groups in civil society through the TWC initiative, in which 
Sintercom served as the online publicity platform.230  
 Besides producing moderated and archived versions of soc.culture.singapore, 
Sintercom began SGDaily, an email service that disseminated articles on Singapore. 
Another feature included a NOT the Straits Times Forum, a section that published 
                                                
227 George, Contentious Journalism, 100. 




contributions that were rejected or carried in edited form, by the letters page of The 
Straits Times. This was evidence of Sintercom’s status as a “contentious” medium 
“challenging the status quo”, allowing readers to judge the extent of censorship of 
letters by the national newspaper, and to highlight cases of questionable journalism.231 
However, due to the impending elections in 2001, authorities demanded Sintercom to 
register, and the justification was that registration intended “to emphasize the need for 
content providers to be responsible and transparent when engaging in the propagation, 
promotion or discussion of political issues relating to Singapore”.232 Due to the 
conditions attached to being a registered site, and with the pressures of self-
censorship, Tan decided to close down the site.  
 However, Sintercom was reborn as New Sintercom a week later, hosted on the 
Geocities service based in the US. This placed the site out of the jurisdiction of the 
Singapore authorities. It was run by an anonymous editor but had other contributors 
who were not as guarded about their identities. Singaporeans could still visit New 
Sintercom and have access to most of the Sintercom archive. This not only illustrated 
the resilience of the Internet media, but also the strength of Sintercom’s open, 
informal structure and its communal ownership.233 The site’s content is based on the 
contribution of columnists, and it regularly features alternative opinions. Readers’ 
comments on the site do not seem to reflect any form of self-censorship as well.  
 During the GE2006 period, the site was not registered, and the site owner 
claimed that MDA did not approach it to register.234 The campaigning period also saw 
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new articles being posted, and the readers did not shy away from commenting on 
them, perhaps knowing very well that the site did not come under the jurisdiction of 
local authorities. Columns featured articles with headlines such as “How the Ruling 
Party twists the courts to their favour”,235 “Aljunied—the Battle of Red Cliff”,236 
“Ward Upgrading and Singaporean Interests”237 with more articles rolling in after the 
polling results. The content of “Aljunied—the Battle of Red Cliff”, arguably 
constituted electoral advertising even though it did not sell a particular party per se, 
for it was certainly blatant in trashing a certain PAP candidate in the Aljunied ward, 
and praising a candidate and the rest of the team fielded by the WP as “ready”. 
 One of the major issues discussed among readers were the regulations 
governing the use of the Internet. As early as January 2006, Yawning Bread, a regular 
blogger,238 had already contributed an article regarding blogging and internet 
regulations during the elections period.239 He suggested grey areas of the legislation to 
exploit, such as the time-fence of “election period”, changing the time-stamp of 
commentaries to before the election period and setting up an anonymous blog on a 
foreign server that is untraceable but establish hyperlinks from the known blog to the 
anonymous blog. He was in effect promoting the exploitation of such technical 
ambiguities, and suggesting that these could be potential strategies of resistance. 
                                                                                                                                       
This was taken from one of the replies of the site owner to questions posed by a The Straits Times 
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 The concern over internet regulations was also voiced by a regular contributor 
to the Sintercom. The columnist, Dharmendra Yadav posted the letter he sent to the 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Information, Communication and the Arts 
(MICA), including the reply that he received.240 He requested that the authorities take 
measures to reform legislation on internet campaigning, as well as to manage media 
and media professionals that supported certain political parties so as to not 
compromise the interests of media consumers which included receiving “factual and 
objective” information. By publicising the correspondence (and in some cases, 
silence) from the relevant authorities such as MICA inform readers how the latter 
respond and correspondingly, how well the public opinion is taken into account by the 
government and to what extent do they act upon their promises. Yadav thus seems to 
have appealed to rightful resistance, applying pressure to those in power to enforce 
existing commitments, increasing the levels of public accountability.241  He also 
furnishes the readers with details from an email interview with a local journalist to 
elaborate on the issue, stating that he was rather satisfied with the response from 
MICA, despite only getting a reply after his second letter to the Ministry.242 The idea 
of allowing such information to be accessible to the general public would be 
unthinkable without the Internet. 
 By allowing visitors to New Sintercom to post their comments on the articles 
featured, readers are engaged in issues which makes the experience a rather 
interactive process. This is something not possible in the print media due to limited 
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space and self-censorship issues.243 In the article “Ward Upgrading and Singaporean 
Interests”244 the columnist makes a case for all tax-paying Singaporean, regardless of 
the wards they are in and their preferred political party to be considered equally for 
the utilisation of public funds for the purposes of upgrading of their living 
environment, particularly lift-upgrading for Housing Development Board (HDB) flats. 
Many responses followed this posting, which attacked various governmental policies.  
 Although New Sintercom seems to be safe from the jurisdiction of the local 
authorities, there are still remnants of fear of conforming to existing rules. A few days 
after polling day, a columnist sang the praises of WP candidate Sylvia Lim, and 
highlighted the fact that the article was posted after the GE, and that he was 
conforming to the rules of domination, adhering to the “public transcript”.245 
 
Think Centre: Online Activism 
Unlike TalkingCock.com that focuses on political satire and Sintercom that emerged 
from online communities, TC’s website developed as an adjunct to traditional offline 
political activities. It has been registered as a society in 2001 by James Gomez, an 
activist who is currently a candidate of the WP.246 TC’s motto conveys a pledge 
“Towards a Vibrant Political Society” and describes itself as “an independent, multi-
partisan political non-governmental organization” which aims to “critically examine 
issues related to political development, democracy, rule of law, human rights and civil 
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society.”247 TC’s activities include research, publishing, organising events and 
networking, and launched the website as a means of publicity and mobilisation. 
 The site’s role progressively grew to include the more journalistic function of 
reporting and commenting on current events, but based on a model of its activist 
roots. It blends advocacy into its journalism, breaching the mainstream media’s 
firewall between observation and participation.248 Besides featuring reports on 
Politics 21, a political education program, the website also publishes reports under 
Human Rights Watch, Media Watch, Policy Watch and Election Watch. These 
sections carry some original content but mostly reports and commentaries from other 
sources, such as international human rights groups, foreign publications and local 
press reports.  
 The media watch component highlighted a key element that TC was protesting 
against—the lack of political freedom in a society where vital avenues for political 
expression, including the press, were controlled by the state. This was illustrated by 
the mainstream media’s “blatant omissions to subtly pejorative framing” of the 
“Abolish ISA event” that was organised together with the Open Singapore Centre to 
mark International Human Rights Day.249 Although it had an online discussion board, 
its Speakers’ Corner Online forum, TC closed it down in response to the amendments 
of the Parliamentary Elections Act’s provisions on campaign advertising because it 
could not control what was said on the forum, and closing it was the only way to 
ensure that the site did not inadvertently contravene the new regulations. As the open 
forum function was not a key aspect of TC’s mission as it was for Sintercom, the 
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former did not shut down entirely like the latter did. During the campaign period of 
2001, TC recognized that there was no clear definition of what comprised election 
advertising and thus opted to take the safer course of not updating its Election Watch 
section. This caution was reinforced as soon as the group was directed to take down 
an article entitled “Young Singaporeans Can the PAP Safeguard your Future?” The 
letter from the authorities notified TC that it had flouted the rules because the author 
was a candidate of the opposition Singapore Democratic Party.250 
 During the next round of elections, the TC editorials decided to a break “to 
avoid political campaigning”, and promised to return after the GE 2006 to examine 
Singaporean's choice.251 Yet, articles pertaining to politics were still being posted, 
although they were not dissenting articles per se. For example, an editorial urged the 
citizenry to vote wisely and also subtly asked readers to look at the larger issues of 
human rights and political freedom instead of materialistic and municipal issues of 
upgrading, among others. Another example was an article by the foreign media 
reporting about a forum252 held before the elections, “Singapore’s Ruling, Opposition 
Parties Debate Political Freedom”253  that focused on a few issues, one of which 
involved the nature of the climate of fear present in Singapore. Two earlier articles 
concerning the GE were posted within two weeks before the campaigning period. The 
first was comparing the ruling party with the opposition in terms of strategy, while the 
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second editorial concerned the media as a determinant “that may boost or capitulate 
the Opposition’s electoral chances” and criticised the media for being biased in their 
reports, and often casting the Opposition in a negative light. Although the site was 
registered, it attempted locate and push the OB markers, publishing these articles that 
were political in nature. 
 TC also seized the opportunity to place foreign press articles before the 
campaign period, such as an article stating that international press freedom group 
Reporters Without Borders (RSF) had condemned Singapore’s restrictions on political 
discussions in blogs and websites ahead of general elections. It also highlighted that 
Singapore ranked 140th out of 167 countries in its annual press freedom index the 
previous year, alongside the likes of Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Egypt and Syria.254 
Although TC did not flout regulations, its bold articles were certainly not helpless 
acquiescence to government intimidation, but an outright critique of the government’s 
stance. 
 
Alternative Websites as Sites of Resistance 
Although the group behind TC had been significantly limited by its circumstances, 
especially by its status as a registered site, this locally-hosted website shows 
Singaporeans that independent alternative views can be expressed without 
punishment, illustrating that boundaries of resistance were more elastic than assumed. 
The regulations imposed for the election campaign was thus more successful in 
impeding the website’s efforts to be an alternative source of political information 
during that period. Compared to the unregistered New Sintercom, TC had to 
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compromise in the field of struggle, threading the line more safely and abiding by the 
rules. However, it would be an understatement to state that the TC was severely 
limited by the regulations as it had moved into gear with the Election Watch series, a 
week-by-week editorials that centred on the opposition, well in advance and in 
anticipation of the elections. TalkingCock.com was more secure in its zone of being 
an “entertainment” site rather than a “serious” political website, therefore managing to 



















Online Forums: Virtual Coffee Shops 
 
Over the past decade, the virtual world has witnessed the emergence of countless 
online forums. Forums typically allow anyone to start a new discussion, otherwise 
known as a thread, or to reply to an existing thread. The range of topics discussed on 
forums is usually quite wide. Besides offering links to news from foreign media, 
providing an arena for an assortment of views to be aired, being a platform for socio-
political commentary pieces and satirical articles that the state-controlled mainstream 
press does not offer, Singaporean online forums can also be viewed as online “coffee 
shops”.255 This chapter seeks to examine content on these online forums, laying out 
the strategies that “forumnites” use in everyday forms of resistance and illustrating the 
constant struggle for hegemony in such arena. 
 This chapter suggests that online forums are useful sites of resistance, as they 
function as arenas for discussion groups and allow for the alternative opinions less 
available in the offline world. It will also demonstrate how netizens engage in “coffee 
shop talk” in these sites by discussing and debating rules and processes of elections 
that have historically worked to the PAP's advantage, expressing unhappiness with the 
ruling party’s policies and strategies during elections; discussing weaknesses of the 
opposition; posting news from alternative sources from the local mainstream media 
and other media sources, as well as recommending articles and discussion topics from 
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other forums and blogs. Although new legislations on electronic communications that 
are political in orientation outlaws all forms of citizen journalism related to the 2006 
election, political banter did not disappear. Interestingly, the profiles of some of these 
forums have been raised by the mainstream media. One or two threads from 
Singaporean forum sites may be summarised and added to the Webthread section of 
The Sunday Times weekly; such threads selected are obviously never those that are 
perceived as too controversial due to mindfulness of ambiguous political OB markers.  
 
sgForums: The Online “Speakers’ Corner” 
Started in 1999, “Singapore’s Online Discussion Network” or sgForums.com, is a 
popular online forum which constitutes a network of online communities. Apart from 
having “chit-chat”, “aunt agony”, “cars”, “food” and “sports” sections, the site 
features a “politics” segment “Speaker’s Corner”, that enables one to “make a point” 
in “politics, government, education” and other related issues. Only registered 
members are allowed to post comments and any sgForums user can create a forum. 
He or she can assign up to three other users as moderators who have the authority to 
change, edit, lock or delete any topic in that forum. 
 The elections certainly stirred up many discussion topics, with many threads 
subsequently consolidated into two main topics by the moderators for neatness sake— 
“We want fair election” and “General Election 2006— Results”. As of 5 June 2006, 





Sammyboy: The Online “Alfresco Coffee Shop” 
Sammyboy’s Alfresco Coffee Shop was set up a few months after “Sam Leong” (or 
“YK Leong” as he revealed to the local press later) started the Sammyboy sex forum. 
According to an email interview with The New Paper which he published online, the 
forum “was created to cater for the spillover of non sex related discussions which 
were polluting the sex forum”.256 Like sgForums, Sammyboy test-controls a regime 
like Singapore. Over the years, Sammyboy has been morphing into an outlet where 
Singaporeans vent and satirise life in the city-state—a “no-go area, where the 
government’s patience has traditionally been pretty short”.257 Claiming that “the real 
Singapore is right here at Sam’s Coffee Shop” and that the forum “may be hard 
hitting at times”, he states that it exists for the “larger good” of Singapore society.258 
According to “Leong”, he chose Delphi Forums because it was free, the messages did 
not expire, the IP address did not appear, and tools were provided which could be 
used to control access to the forum.259 
 
soc.culture.singapore: the Alternative Newsgroup  
soc.culture.singapore is a popular newsgroup that offers many topics for discussion. It 
spun off from “soc.culture.asean” in 1992, and postings on these newsgroups, which 
predated the www “occasionally ventured into free-for-alls on politics and current 
affairs.260  In essence, newsgroups are a means of “public discussion” which 
resembles e-mail, and can be read by many around the world. One significant 
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difference between forums and newsgroups or electronic mailing lists lies in the fact 
that the latter automatically delivers new messages to the subscriber, while forums 
require the member to visit the website, and check for new posts. Also, additional 
software, a “newsreader”, is usually required for participation in newsgroups, while 
visiting and participating in forums normally requires no additional software apart 
from a web browser. 
 During the GE2001, the authorities signalled that they were watching 
cyberspace and that dissent would not be tolerated. Just after the GE, Robert Ho 
Chong was sent to the Institute of Mental Health for psychiatric evaluation after 
allegedly posting inflammatory articles on the Internet. He was accused of posting the 
article “Break the Law and Get Away with It, Like PAP” on the Singaporeans for 
Democracy website and soc.culture.singapore, allegedly encouraging electors to enter 
polling stations without authority on Polling Day. This incident was classified as an 
attempt to incite violence or disobedience to the law which was likely to lead to a 
breach of peace.261 The article was written with the intention of highlighting the 
hypocrisy of the ruling party, because some PAP ministers were seen entering polling 
stations without authority on polling day in 1997, and if what they did was not illegal, 
then the same should apply for all other Singaporeans. 
 
Major Issues of Contention During the Election Season 
During the 2006 election season, recurring issues of justice and unfair practices by the 
ruling party were raised in these forums. In sgForums.com, posts pertaining to the 
elections started as early as February with main topics of discussion being: the 
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unfairness of the GRC system as it favoured the incumbent;262 the basis on which PM 
Lee appealed for votes for the PAP (that if PAP did not receive a strong mandate, it 
would signal higher political risks to potential foreign investors, thereby hurting the 
local economy);263 the PAP’s “buying of votes” through the Progress Package, among 
other “goodies”;264 the ministers’ high salaries and their personal attacks against 
opponents;265 as well as other contradictions in the PAP’s policies.266 Some even 
suggested boycotting the elections267 and using the Internet, e-mail and short message 
system (SMS) to launch a mass movement to demand for fair elections. 268 
 In Sammyboy, the number of messages posted did not wane in the face of 
electoral regulations as well. On the contrary, many posts relating to the elections 
were put up with the central topics of discussion being: the ban on political 
podcasting;269 the use of new technologies to override regulations;270 and the eroding 
legitimacy of the PAP.271 
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 Like sgForums and Sammyboy, soc.culture.singapore hosted active 
discussions on politics during the election campaign. One can observe significant 
amounts of postings dissenting to the ruling party. The highlights of discussions 
include the PAP’s control of the “weapon of mass deceptions”—the mainstream 
media;272 the use of election sweeteners;273 the PAP’s handling of the Gomez affair;274 
the ruling party’s lack of consultation with the masses before policy implementation275 
and PM Lee’s usage of the word “fix” during the lunchtime rally.276 
 In all three forums, forumnites voiced their unhappiness with media bias in the 
reporting of the election results, the meagre air-time given to opposition winners, with 
many congratulating the winners from opposition teams after polling day and voicing 
their opinions on the merits of having more opposition members in parliament. Some 
even questioned if the ruling party would live up to their promises in the next five 
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years, pressurising them to fulfil these expectations. This essentially demonstrates the 
workings of hegemony as a process, for the ruling party can only obtain consent 
through hard work. 
 
Online Forums as Sites of Resistance 
This section examines the various strategies of resistance on Internet forums, which 
mainly include: exploiting linkages among cyberspace entities, employing tactics that 
counter biased media coverage, gossiping, as well as donning a veil of anonymity.  
 
The Network of Forums, Blogs and Other Cyberspace Entities 
Information tends to be circulated amongst forums to allow for conveyance of 
important news. Forumnites also post interesting articles from blogs and other 
sources, demonstrating the complex network of resisters. A member from sgForums 
posted two articles by Seah Chiang Nee of Littlespeck on gerrymandering and unfair 
media coverage,277 exemplifying the way in which one Internet form promotes 
another. “Duotiga83” posted a photo that has been widely circulated amongst other 
blogs and forums, showing a vandalised electrical box near a traffic light in Singapore 
bearing graffitied words “jobs for foreigner [sic]”, “N.S. for S’poreans” and “Lee 
Dynasty”.278 This act of vandalism eludes to what Scott envisioned—that “everyday 
forms of resistance” should stop short of outright and collective defiance, and instead 
draw from “the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups: foot dragging, 
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dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, 
arson, sabotage, and so on”.279 Therefore this study seeks to offer an unobtrusive 
account of non-compliance, that the “marginalised” citizens who have restricted 
political space to manoeuvre, use the Internet as a space to grumble, and exhibit the 
grumblings of others. As Scott suggests, “the purpose of grumbling is often not 
simply self-expression, but the attempt to bring the pressure of discontent to bear on 
elites”.280 The “grumblers” have to be extremely prudent, for “if the message is too 
explicit, its bearers risk open retaliation; if it is too vague, it passes unnoticed 
altogether.”281  
Sammyboy was also popular as a conducive spot for to dissemination of 
information and for seeking support for online petitions. For instance, the online 
petition set up by some forumnites in Sammyboy “Upgrading should be a separate 
issue from the General Election”, had collected 2128 signatures thus far,282 with 
publicity for such petitions being supplied by blogs such as mrbrown.com and 
Singapore Election Watch blog.283 Although the petition was not largely successful in 
terms of signature-collection and was fraught with repeated signatures causing 
credibility problems, it is not an exaggeration to state that these forums have been 
useful sites of dissemination for public mobilisation tools, not to mention being good 
platforms for citizens to air views. Online petitions seem to be the new wave in local 
social mobilisation for in 2005, at least 43,654 signatures were collected to call for the 
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resignation of (former) NKF CEO T.T. Durai, and it is evident that people in positions 
of power did take notice of these signatures with politicians referring to the petition or 
Internet discussions on occasion.284  
 Links to, and analysis from other blogs such as Yawning Bread, Mr Wang 
Bakes Good Karma and Singabloodypore were also present in such forums as  
sources of alternative information. Besides Sammyboy, soc.culture.singapore has also 
been a platform for contributors to disseminate links to a series of satirical podcasts 
from mrbrown.com,285 one of which contains a spoof of the election drama 
surrounding the James Gomez issue. This series of podcasts that enjoyed immense 
popularity will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Countering Unfair Media Coverage 
These online forums had exploited technology to critique the perceptible biased media 
coverage of the elections, as well as rules governing election advertising. In the case 
of sgForums, a rally speech by Steve Chia of the Singapore Democratic Alliance 
(SDA) was posted. Other members followed suit by adding the links to videos of the 
opposition parties’ rally speeches and by posting articles from the foreign media 
critical of the ruling party.286 Forumnites in Sammyboy were also confident of the 
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capabilities of the technology in overriding regulations, with “Makapa” highlighting 
an excerpt from the blog Singabloodypore, demonstrating that even though podcasts, 
pictures and videocasts of political rallies are banned by the authorities, they would 
still surface on blogs, forums and other websites. “PeasantMoNkEy” opined that 
“there is no way [the government] can stop such technologies from being used” and 
was quite confident that more new technologies such as instant video streaming from 
and by a cell phone will be available in the next GE.287 “Wah Piangz!” agreed that if 
they do, “[the government would] bring bad publicity to themselves and risk 
becoming a laughing stock”.288 
 soc.culture.singapore had also acted as a site for citizen journalism, as one 
member’s posting about turnouts for various parties’ rallies. The posting reported the 
sharp discrepancy between the turnouts of the PAP’s rally on 1st May and the WP’s 
rally on 30th April.289 This posting was significant because the government banned 
posting of photos and videos of rallies on websites for the election campaign week. 
The site therefore acted as an alternative source of election rallies coverage that made 
up for the mainstream media’s inadequate coverage. 
 Forums are thus perceived to be credible sources of information by some 
netizens—and they are not as irrational, chaotic and unreliable as the government has 
claimed them to be. Statements by netizens in threads corroborate the credibility of 
information on such forums and this is indicative of the reliability of forums as sites 
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of resistance. For instance, “banzie” from sgForums declared that he used to be quite 
supportive of PAP and just a little of WP, but after nine days of pursuing news from 
online forums and blogs, he grew more supportive of the opposition. He expressed 
thanks to those who posted news in the forum, stating that he was “pretty fooled by 
the media” and that he was “very angry that our media had such a bias stand”.290  
 
Gossip and Rumour  
Gossip was also a regular feature in these forums for they serve as sites for ridicule 
and “elite-bashing”. A particular forumnite in Sammyboy referred to the father, son 
and daughter-in-law as the “Unholy trinity”291 while another spoke of “the father, the 
son and the holy Goh”.292 The forum was also not short of sarcastic messages laced 
with hints of irony. One member urged other forumnites to “Leave PAP Alone!”,293 
arguing that we ought to “be grateful to PAP and [the] Lee family” for without them, 
“we [would be] still farmers”, because the opposition was “hopeless” and 
“redundant”. He went on to exclaim that “Singapore is PAP and PAP is Singapore”, 
urging readers to “forget about elections and alternative” and hailing China as an 
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example because of its “prosper[ity] under one party rule [with] everyone … going 
China … [whilst] … Taiwan [being] so chaotic with elections”.294  
 As Scott suggests, gossip can function as a kind of “democratic ‘voice’ in 
conditions where power and possible repression make open acts of disrespect 
dangerous”, thereby “achiev[ing] the expression of opinion, of contempt, of 
disapproval while minimizing the risks of identification and reprisal”, allowing for the 
“chip[ping] away at the reputation” of the ruling party.295 It is acknowledged though 
that it is difficult to decipher gossip from truth, because he unnamed sources cannot 
be traced easily. Two scenarios are evident though—one, that those who believe the 
rumours and will continue to spread them because they think that others ought to 
know the truth, and two, that they continue spreading rumours albeit knowing that 
they are not true. This study suggests that many treat stories passed from forum to 
forum as gossip—a safer option to prima facie belief in all information.  
Nonetheless, such rumours do get disseminated as acts of resistance against 
elites.  As such rumours travel, they are “altered in a fashion that brings [them] more 
closely into line with the hopes, fears, and worldview of those who hear [them] and 
those who retell [them]”.296 A rumour circulating in the forums revolved around 
views by a “well regarded senior journalist/editor from SPH” who had “top level 
access to a lot of people”. These views, as “Duotiga83” quoted from “Serenditpity” 
[sic] from the Sammyboy forum,297  consisted of various comments ranging from the 
PAP’s worry that they were not returned on nomination day, to claims that “many 
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[were] really concerned with the kind of damage that LKY [was] doing with his 
interviews”, to suggestions that “the entire ISD [was] busy trying to dig up something 
on Sylvia”, to statements that the PAP was actually happy that WP had not 
aggressively touched on the core issues of jobs and CPF cuts, and that their strategy 
was to keep the WP busy with the Gomez issue, so that other important issues would 
get sidelined.298 The rumour thus effectively portrayed the members of the PAP as 
vulnerable, fallible humans, not entirely confident of winning the elections and 
feeling threatened enough to use the ISD to mudsling Sylvia Lim, a WP candidate, 
who stood a fair chance of winning the Aljunied elections. Insofar as the truth-content 
of these issues remains somewhat unverifiable, the very act of raising such concerns 
does demonstrate the possibility of insecurities within the ruling party which can in 
turn affect voter confidence to a certain extent.  
  
Anonymity  
Online forums are also conducive sites of resistance because of the anonymity 
allowed in the posting of messages. The power of such anonymity lies in allowing 
netizens the freedom to express dissent—a liberty not sufficiently enjoyed offline. An 
overall observation of forum postings points to the fact that there are many forumnites 
who do contribute constructive criticism and offer credible alternative points of view. 
However, there are also those who use abusive language, post irrelevant and 
nonsensical material, and those who seek to damage reputations with malicious 
rumours. Not many posts are of such nature however, and most are highly critical and 
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insightful. Unfortunately, the content of such posts can be misconstrued especially if 
satire is employed. 
There are those who misunderstand the tone of the posts, taking them at face 
value, and misinterpreting the author’s intentions. Nonetheless, observations show 
that those who do make such mistakes, or even those who spread obvious false 
information are reprimanded by other participators, and thus, it is apparent that a 
premium is placed on a certain extent of research and accuracy in the content of 
postings (like the offline world). It is therefore too sweeping a statement to declare 
that forums are a convenient arena for the flaming of rumours, because they are 
quickly quelled by other more discerning forumnites.  
 It is also interesting to observe that some forumnites hesitate to use the full 
names of targeted characters of critique, opting to use abbreviations instead. This can 
be attributed to convenience and perhaps, more likely so, it marks an attempt at 
caution for fear of reprisal. Dissent under the veil of anonymity is what Scott deems 
as an “everyday form of resistance”. Although such abbreviations are easily 
decipherable, a possibly strong reason for invoking them would be that abstinence 
from using a full name weakens the case for libel (although the courts may use a test 
of the man-on-the-street to judge the case).  
As the discussion of anonymity in Chapter One suggests, the idea of 
anonymity relates closely to the analogy of the panoptic structure of the Internet. To 
say that it is impossible for authorities to identify the authors would be an 
exaggeration, given that the methods of hi-tech surveillance are constantly refined and 
updated. Thus, to minimise the possibilities of being tracked down, many employ 
ways and means to prevent identification, for instance, providing false particulars 
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when registering in various forums. This mask of anonymity gives the Internet user 
greater confidence in conveying his or her true feelings, that is, in voicing the hidden 
transcript without fear of repercussion. Of course, such precautions are still taken 
despite consciousness of the near impossibility of mass state prosecution, given the 



















The Emergence of Blogs 
 
This chapter engages textual analysis in exploring web logs, commonly known as 
blogs, to investigate the various forms of counter-hegemonic discourse, specifically 
analysing the pursuit of different strategies in voicing political opinions and 
disenchantment with official discourse and state policies. From blatant rants to poetic 
reflections and satire, this chapter uncovers the everyday individual activities that fall 
short of open, declared and collective opposition. It seems that bloggers in Singapore 
have found an alternate sphere for political discourse in cyberspace without the 
ramifications of state penalty. The weapons are not only the communicative tool of 
the Internet itself but are also expressions of various narrative forms in cyberspace 
that take advantage of the openness of the Internet. This chapter thus explores the use 
of blogs as a “weapon of the weak” by examining a few key blogs from the local 
blogging community, seeking to examine how these bloggers have managed to voice 
dissent by taking cover behind apparent meanings, circumventing legal penalties, 
especially in light of tighter regulations during the election period.  
 Blogs are forms of interactive media that serve as popular communication 
tools,299 and are, put simply, personal journals that are published on the web. 
According to Kahn and Kellner, the relative ease in creation and maintenance of blogs 
means that even non-technical web users own blogs without significant problem, 
contributing to the success of such blogs.300 In fact, Technorati.com claims to be 
                                                
299 Richard Kahn and Douglas Kellner, “New Media and Internet Activism: From the ‘Battle of Seattle’ 
to Blogging”, New Media & Society, 6,1 (2004), 91. 
300 Ibid., 91. 
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tracking 48.5 million blogs and counting.301 Kahn and Kellner argue that this 
relatively new blogging subculture is relevant for political analysis, because some 
bloggers are technoactivists who favour democratic self-expression and networking, 
and global media critique and journalistic socio-political intervention.302 They 
expound that new media developments in technoculture such as blogging has led to a 
reconfiguration of politics and culture and a refocusing of politics on everyday life.303 
Singaporeans are part of this global phenomenon as a quick count on the 
“Singapore Blog Directory and Blog Search Engine”304 on the Internet throws up 
about 1400 blogs, with categories ranging from art and photography, entertainment, 
lifestyle, news,305 personal and diary, to sports and technology. In most of these blogs, 
readers can leave their comments, making it a rather interactive process between 
blogger and reader. Blogs are also linked to one another, enabling the reader to jump 
to the author’s recommended blogs. There are also specific links of words in blog 
entries called “tags” to link words to similar entries on other blogs. The process and 
structure of linkages builds informal networks, contributing to a sense of cyber-
community. Blogging is also becoming identified as “citizen journalism” as bloggers 
have been known to raise socio-political issues in their blogs and report on everyday 
happenings. The local blog scene has also been followed rather closely by the 
mainstream media, occasionally highlighting issues that have been discussed 
                                                
301 Sourced from Technorati <http://www.technorati.com>, a website that claims to track what is going 
on in the “blogosphere”. Technorati feature tags that link blogs to one another and the site. 
302 Kahn and Kellner, New Media, 91. 
303 Ibid., 93. 
304 Singapore Blog Directory, <www.bloggersg.com> (26 May 2006). The online blog directory 
showcases blogs started by Singaporean bloggers. Bloggers are encouraged to add their blogs here and 
let others rate their blogs, hence the website features “top-rated”, “most popular” and “newly-added” 
blogs. 
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online.306 More famous blogs include Mr Wang Bakes Good Karma,307 Yawning 
Bread,308 Singabloodypore,309 mrbrown.com, mrmiyagi.com and A Xenoboy in Sg.310 
Led by well-known bloggers mr brown (Lee Kin Mun) and Mr Miyagi (Benjamin 
Lee), some Singaporeans have started the web site <www.tomorrow.sg>, a daily log 
of the best Singapore blogs.  
  Indeed, the rising trend of blogs in recent years has attracted the attention of 
the authorities. In January 2006, the Institute of Policy Studies, on behalf of the 
government, conducted a closed door discussion (“Blogging and the Law”) with some 
local bloggers to get a better understanding of the blogging phenomenon.311 Just 
before the recent GE2006, the state attempted to tighten its grip over Internet content 
by implementing further legislation and guidelines that affected the blogging and 
podcasting community. This did not seem to deter bloggers. During the nine-day 
election campaign, the number of blog articles on the subject averaged over 190.312  
 During a political dialogue held a few weeks after the elections, Denise Phua 
of the PAP voiced her concern with regards to the political influence of blogs, 
especially “the negative political views expressed in internet forums during the 
hustings”.313 Concerned with seemingly slanted views on the Internet, the MP opined 
that “…something has gone wrong when more than 85 per cent (of the traffic) writes 
                                                
306 The weekly “Digital Life” section of The Straits Times devotes a column to some blog discussions. 
307 Mr Wang Bakes Good Karma <http://commentarysingapore.blogspot.com/> 
308 Yawning Bread <http://www.yawningbread.org/> 
309 Singabloodypore <http://singabloodypore.blogspot.com/> 
310 A Xeno Boy in Sg <http://xenoboysg.blogspot.com> 
311 “Mr Brown” from <http://mrbrown.com>, “Mr Miyagi” from <http://miyagi.sg/> and “Mr Wang” 
from Mr Wang Bakes Good Karma <http://commentarysingapore.blogspot.com/> were among those 
invited to participate in the discussion. 
312 Farah Abdul Rahim, “Blogging activity up during election campaigning” Channel NewsAsia, 12 
May 2006 
<http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/207967/1/.html> (26 May 20/06). 
313 S. Ramesh, “Reasons for 12% of non-voters, spoilt votes should be analysed: NUSS Forum” 
Channel NewsAsia, 
<http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/210087/1/.html> (26 May 2006). 
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negatively about the PAP”.314 While stating that “this is something that the PAP 
would do well to take into account…and to manage this channel of 
communication”,315 it seemed only apparent that the authorities had taken notice of 
the Internet in terms of its ability to influence public opinion. Even though the 
Internet did not possess the capabilities to considerable challenge local conventional 
media in terms of outreach the masses it did seem evident that people were hungry for 
alternative sources of news, and growing less afraid to voice dissent on the Internet. 
As the GE2006 had tossed up some controversial issues, the following section 
highlights how bloggers used cyberspace as a weapon to resist the hegemonic 
discourse of the ruling party. 
 
Covering the 2006 Elections 
As elaborated earlier in Chapter Two, the government established a stricter set of 
election advertising regulations in 2006, including making those who “persistently 
promote[d] political views” register their sites with the MDA. Arguing that the 
regulations “set a certain standard and help[ed] maintain order and accountability in 
the way political issues [were being] discussed over the Internet”,316 the state is 
effectively controlling the political discourse and disciplining the Internet. The web 
community would, more likely than not, have to practice self-censorship with the 
knowledge that “political” websites were being monitored and thus be somewhat 
                                                
314 Derrick A Paulo, “PAP Must Address ‘Negative Internet’” Today, 24 May 2006. The dialogue was 
organised by the National University of Singapore Society (NUSS) and the panel included Dr Chee 
Soon Juan, secretary-general of the Singapore Democratic Party, Perry Tong from the WP and political 
scientist Dr. Ho Khai Leong. 
315 Ibid. 
316 Chia, “New Media, Same Rules”. 
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stifled as critical commentaries and debates would have to be toned down with people 
becoming more hesitant to voice out their thoughts on political issues.  
 Nonetheless, despite initial concerns of the clampdown, the “blogosphere” 
was abuzz with activities. In response to the imposition of these new regulations, 
bloggers were observed to have come up with creative ways of bypassing these rules 
with some ignoring these rules altogether, playing the game of how “political” could 
be defined, and how the terms “explicitly political”, “election advertising” and 
“during elections” could be construed. 
 
Blogs as Sites of Resistance 
Exploiting Technical Ambiguities  
Some bloggers have made interesting observations to circumvent existing regulations, 
taking advantage of the technical ambiguities involved in definitions and other issues. 
One of the rules involving podcasting is elaborated on by Dr. Balaji Sadasivan, the 
Senior Minister of State for Information, Communications and the Arts: 
There are also some well-known local blogs run by private individuals who have 
ventured into podcasting. The content of some of these podcasts can be quite 
entertaining. However, the streaming of explicit political content by individuals 
during the election period is prohibited under the Election Advertising Regulations. 
A similar prohibition would apply to the videocasting or video streaming of explicitly 
political content.317 
 
 Local poet/writer and blogger, Alfian Bin Sa’at,318 highlighted one of the 
technical ambiguities of the election advertising regulations on the Internet aptly: 
‘During elections’ is a very interesting phrase. One can understand that a 
campaigning period is the time when people can start doing things like hold election 
rallies, canvass door-to-door for support, allow the Speak Mandarin Campaign to 
take a rest as candidates charm heartlanders with Teochew in Hougang and Hokkien 
                                                
317 Hasnita A Majid, “Podcasting is not allowed during elections” Channel NewsAsia,  3 April 2006. 
<http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/201330/1/.html> (30 April 2006). 
318 This paper uses the real names of bloggers if they have intentionally revealed their real identities on 
their blogs. However I will only use the pseudonyms of the blogger if he/she does not reveal it on the 
blog, even if his/her identity has been disclosed by other sources. 
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in Toa Payoh. But what does this mean for blogs, which consist of continuous 
entries, sorted by date? Does this mean one has to stop blogging during the election 
period? But then there are archives—consisting of entries which are technically 
written before this time period comes into effect. How to import this concept of the 
‘election period’ into blogs? Obviously an ‘election period’ holds for rallies, because 
we are dealing with a synchronic idea: ‘at a specific moment in time’. But the blog is 
a diachronic creature: ‘occurring over a period of time’.319 
 
Opting to nitpick on technical issues that are difficult to resolve offers resisters 
maneuvering space because dates on blogs can be easily manipulated and links to 
earlier political commentary can be made without contravening the rules.  
 Commenting on the justifications for registration, Alfian attempted to question 
the underlying intentions: 
Is it really as innocent as asking people to be accountable for their statements? I don't 
think many bloggers in Singapore—from mrbrown to Alex Au at Yawning Bread are 
anonymous. What I think is that scaremongering tactics are at work—the very 
mention of 'register' conveys surrender to some unsavoury surveillance.320 
 Consequently, Alfian took offence at the minister’s attempt to relegate the 
medium as “quite entertaining”, because it implied that podcasts were for those whose 
“deviant tastes actually find this stuff worth their attention”,321 insinuating that 
Internet content and podcasting were found frivolous, and not credible enough to be 
taken seriously. 
 The issue of political content also raises a few issues. Firstly, what is explicitly 
political? Secondly, does it mean that ‘implicit’ political content is allowed? Alfian 
proceeded to play a game with the readers (and perhaps lurking surveillance 
personnel) by displaying three different captioned pictures that had dual (or more) 
meanings, which interpreted in certain ways, seemed to constitute swipes at the ruling 
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In the same post, Alfian nicknamed Dr. Balaji Sadasivan, the Senior Minister of State 
for Information, Communications and the Arts, the “Minister of State for 
Misinformation, Miscommunication and the Art of Gossiping with Unnamed 
Epidemiologists”.322 This act of nicknaming or character assassination makes 
reference to earlier events, in particular a series of speeches made by the minister the 
previous year that had stirred controversy. The name-calling is thus purely symbolic 
resistance which “achieves the expression of opinion, of contempt, of disapproval”,323 
congruent to what Scott had described of the peasants in Sedaka.324 These forms of 
resistance such as gossip and character assassination which involve an appeal to 
shared normative standards are grounded by its sanctioning power, albeit in a mild 
form. The condemnation of the minister is inscribed with it the intention to belittle his 
social standing and influence as a politician.  
 
Rightful Resistance 
It is also observed that bloggers routinely employ rightful resistance in their 
narratives. Shortly after the announcement of the new regulations, Mr Wang Says So 
                                                
322 In this description, Alfian makes reference to a speech made by Dr Sadasivan made during a 
Ministry of Health budget speech on 9th March 2005 during Parliament whereby he stated that an 
epidemiologist had suggested that the sharp increase of HIV in the gay community maybe be linked to 
the annual predominantly gay party in Sentosa- the Nation Party-“which allowed gays from high 
prevalence societies to fraternize with local gay men, seeding the infection in the local community. 
Speech obtained from the Ministry of Health official website 
<http://www.moh.gov.sg/corp/about/newsroom/speeches/details.do?id=30507044> (31 May 2006) 
323 Scott, Weapons, 282. 
324 Ibid., 282. 
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seemed to have taken the cue from authorities and revealed in his blog that he would 
be talking about “interests outside the sphere of Singapore politics and current 
affairs”.325 As a hint, he published a photo of the PM speaking to reporters with the 
caption: “I’m very disappointed, Mr. Wang. Obviously you don’t trust me, even 
though I’d said in 2004 that one of my goals as PM is to make Singapore an open 
society.”326  
 Upon clicking on the link “open society”, one is led to another page on his 
blog that features a letter published on The Straits Times forum in which the 
contributor, Associate Professor Koo Tsai Kee, defended his views of Singapore 
being an open society, rebutting George Soros’ statements.327 As part of the response 
to the letter in that earlier post, Mr Wang listed chronologically a series of thirteen 
events/issues during the period of May to December 2005 that showcases limitations 
in freedom of expression, press freedom, freedom of association and academic 
freedom, in which he ends by stating “Tell me again, Tsai Kee, with a straight face, 
that we are an open society. I’ll try not to laugh”.328 This act illustrates the 
employment of “rightful resistance”,329 the framing of claims with reference to the 
ideology or policies used. When Mr Wang made reference to PM Lee’s speech, he 
                                                
325 “Mr Wang Has Psychic Powers”, Mr Wang Bakes Good Karma, 7 April 2006 
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demanded the enforcement of existing commitments, and a strict adherence to the 
rhetoric of policymakers, in this case, making Singapore a more open society. 
 Another post includes an open letter to PM Lee on his blog. In the letter, Mr 
Wang harped on PM Lee’s insecurity about the opposition and appealed to the PM not 
to destroy his political opponents for if they were truly incompetent, they would 
“expose themselves”, but if they were not, then their contributions mattered too.330 
Also, Mr Wang urged PM Lee to “stop dumbing down to the people” as that made it 
very easy for people like himself to ridicule him and his speeches. He also advised 
PM Lee not to forget “the little man”, “the old and poor”, “the Normal Stream kids”, 
the ex-convict trying to put his life back together, the “old ah ma” still washing public 
toilets, the “single mum who can’t apply for a HDB flat”, the “70 year-old man still 
trapped in his Potong Pasir flat because you don’t build a lift for him to get down” 
and not to remember them only every five years, i.e. just before the elections.331  
 By writing this open letter and by publishing it in the public sphere of the 
Internet, this method of resistance is thus successful not because the PM will heed his 
advice, but the message is evident and conveyed, leaving little reason for the PM to 
threaten legal action. Furthermore, considering that if the letter was sent to the PM 
himself, there would be no guarantee that it would be read by anyone at all. In fact the 
impact of posting the letter on this sphere is more effective, because it signalled to the 
other readers that the ruling party had much to do to win the consent of the masses. 
 
 
                                                





Humour, Satire and Parody 
Bloggers also make use of humour, satire and parody to convey political messages. A 
post by Mr Wang included a link to a report that named Singapore as the 83rd most 
democratic country in the world. Under the post was a cleverly inserted picture of 
Kim Jong Il captioned: “Damnit! Narrowly defeated by Singapore again!”,332 
insinuating that Singapore was almost comparable to the authoritarian regime of 
North Korea. Mr Wang also referred to PM Lee’s statements of “fixing the 
opposition” and the PAP’s “buying [of] the supporters’ votes” as a “self-slap in the 
face”.333 In a later post, he cheekily displayed a photo of Saddam Hussein with the 
caption “More than 85% of all Iraqi bloggers write negatively about me! There’s just 
no balance… I need to fix them!”334 
Many bloggers have also reacted strongly to the PAP’s (and the state-
controlled media’s) offensive during the James Gomez saga.335 In response to the 
dramatisation of this episode by the PAP, comments in the blogosphere have been 
scathing and abundant. Meanwhile, Mr Brown and Mr Miyagi, two popular bloggers 
had been putting up a series of “persistently non-political” election podcast bulletins 
that revolved around the election issues and drama.336 One extremely popular 
download during that period was an audio podcast parodying this episode, framing it 
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as “persistently non-political” because MICA Minister Balaji Sadasivan had earlier 
announced that “persistently political” podcasts were banned. The parody portrays 
James Gomez as a customer, “Jeff Lopez”, and the PAP as a “bar chor mee” seller 
and depicts a “misunderstanding” between both parties, when the “bar chor mee” 
seller serves Lopez “bar chor mee” with liver, causing Lopez to complain, insisting 
that he did not want any liver. The parody goes on to depict the indignant hawker 
retorting that Lopez had never specified that he did not want any liver, and that he had 
only specified he did not want chilli. To prove his point, the hawker produces a 
CCTV recording to show that Lopez did not state what he claimed to have said upon 
placing his order. The hawker subsequently continuously insists that Lopez explain 
himself despite the latter’s apology.  
 The parody is not difficult to decode. The parallels between the use of CCTV 
monitoring at a hawker centre and the seller’s refusal to accept repeated apologies, 
and the events that transpired in the James Gomez issue, are uncanny, cleverly 
encapsulating the absurdity of the whole episode. The intent of the parody is 
obviously to poke fun at the PAP for harping on such a small issue and for demanding 
an explanation from Gomez even his apologies. This parody of a minor paperwork 
bungle has been downloaded 30,000 times, excluding partial downloads.337 This does 
not include the number of times the clip has been circulated through mobile phones 
and emails. This episode has been said to have raked up sympathy for Gomez and 
scored points for the WP in general.  
In response to this podcast, Lee Boon Yang, Minister for MICA, stated that he 
had received the podcast from a friend during his campaigning, and that he had to: 
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… congratulate Mr Brown … for his funny and clever work … However, my 
assessment is that this is symptomatic of the nature of the Internet. The root issue 
which was parodied in the podcast was actually a serious issue of intention and 
integrity. So while podcasts can be very entertaining, it would be dangerous if 
important decisions such as electing representatives of Parliament were based on 
which side can make the most funny video or podcast. It is good to have a sense of 
humour but we must take care not to allow humour or satire to mask the key issues. 
The bottom line is that a sense of humour is necessary but, more importantly, we 
must remember that elections and choice of leaders for the country are serious 
matters.338 
 
Contrary to Lee’s sentiments, the parody is far from frivolous and has acted as a 
powerful medium to convey a strong political message to audiences. In this case, the 
pre-existing discursive entity of the ruling party’s rhetoric is repeated and 
simultaneously transformed, for humour and/or ridicule.339 The satire is, in essence a 
mask to redefine the key issues as laid out by “legitimate” political discourse. Thus, it 
is natural that Lee publicly devalued satire, for the ruling party could possibly lose the 
power of agenda setting, in the face of undermining satirical critique. To the PAP, the 
“serious issue of intention and integrity” was key, but to the satirist and to most 
audiences of the parody, the extent to which the PAP blew up the whole episode is the 
underlying message. It also seems ironic that the detractor in this case is the one who 
made humour an imperative. 
 Another example of parody being employed as a mode of resistance in blogs 
can be seen in another popular audio podcast made by Mr Brown and Mr Miyagi. The 
clip contains a conversation between two students discussing the “struggles of the 
education system” in Singapore.340 It seems apparent, to discerning listeners, that the 
students are in fact questioning the “clear mandate” of the PAP. One student equated 
                                                
338 “A Keen Eye On GE Bloggers, But Touch Gets Lighter” Today, 1 June 2006 and “Bak Chor Mee 
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the score of 66.6% (the percentage of votes that the PAP obtained in GE2006) to a 
grade of B3 and hinted that it was not a clear mandate by alluding to a previous “test 
score of 75%” that was “good” in comparison, making the “B3” result less admirable. 
This analogy is apt, especially for a state that tends to be obsessive about results and 
the streaming of students at a young age. Thus, these bloggers have succeeded in 
conveying a message with equivocal meanings, avoiding streaming “explicit” political 
content.  
  
Alternative Media/Citizen Journalism 
Blogs have also served as credible alternate sources of information as compared to the 
mainstream media. This is especially so because of its penchant for countering biased 
framing of issues by the mainstream media and its provision of alternative coverage 
on election rallies. Mr Wang took issue with the statements made by PM Lee, who 
urged voters to send the right signals to two multi-national companies planning to 
invest in projects in Singapore, stating that their decision hinged on the outcome of 
the elections.341 Mr Wang referred to the statements made by one of the companies, 
Shell, on the factors that would influence the decision,342 and reported that none 
pertained to the elections or political climate of Singapore.343 Mr Wang thus 
effectively debunking the official discourse of the ruling party’s that equated the 
presence of opposition parties in parliament with socio-economic instability. In 
backing up his claims with official statements from the giant economic investor itself, 
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he highlighted the insecurities of the ruling party and their inability to accept the 
existence of opposition members in the parliament. This sort of analyses is rarely 
found in Singapore’s government-controlled mainstream media. 
 Although “explicit political content” was disallowed during the election 
period, bloggers were still able to detect biased media slants on issues and they did 
attempt to offer alternative and more well-balanced takes on the same issues. For 
instance, Alex Au of Yawning Bread offered coverage at the Hougang WP rally, one 
that the mainstream media did not cover. He offered a “factual transmission” and a 
rather detailed description of the emotions felt, taking the trouble to capture pictures 
of the large crowd present at the rally.344 He uploaded pictures of rally turnouts for the 
PAP and WP for comparison, a move that the media conveniently refrained from 
making. This comparison on his blog managed to show how The Straits Times 
attempted to create the effect of a “crowd” at PAP rallies with camera-angle 
techniques and selectivity in photos published. All this was done by Au despite the 
ban on posting photographs of opposition rallies online. 
 Yawning Bread also raised the issue of the mainstream media’s covering up of 
PM Lee’s use of the word ‘fix’ in his speech during a lunchtime rally at Boat Quay. 
Mr Lee took the tack that more Opposition members in Parliament—perhaps 10 to 
20—would cause gridlock in Government as the ruling party begins to focus on 
‘fixing’ the Opposition instead of on implementing the ‘right policy for 
Singapore’.345 
 
Highlighting the fact that Today had used the word “fixed” in inverted commas and 
The Straits Times had replaced the word with “countered”, Yawning Bread 
endeavored to expose the media’s feeble attempt to perform damage control for the 
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fiasco.346 Yawning Bread also pointed out that even after Lee’s press secretary issued 
a public clarification to say that he meant “counter” even though he said “fix”, the 
Singaporean who only depended solely on The Straits Times for information, would 
not have known what was transpiring because the word “fix” never appeared in 
reports. Yawning Bread remarked in jest: 
It's like newspapers in totalitarian countries one morning reporting that the 
government, with much pomp and ceremony, has declared the epidemic over, 
without ever having reported that there was an epidemic in the first place.347 
 
 The PM’s unsavoury use of the word “fix” has also been derided in many 
other blogs besides Yawning Bread. The arguments are usually framed along the lines 
of justice, fairness and promises by the ruling party for an open society. Molly Meek 
devoted an entire post harping on the word “fix”,348 which hinted that perhaps it was 
the bloggers who were going to be “fixed” next. This was with obvious reference to 
the frequent discrepancies between the ruling party’s rhetoric and its actions. 
 Other blogs such as Singapore Elections Watch also took issue with PM Lee’s 
word choice.349 The blog pointed out the hypocrisy of the PAP by comparing PM 
Lee’s slip of tongue when stating his intentions to “fix” the opposition MPs and “buy” 
votes, to the Gomez case. The blog cleverly argued that it was odd that the PM could 
get away with a slip of the tongue whilst Gomez could not, being pressed with 
criminal charges for his absent-mindedness about the forms.350  
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 Citizen journalism played a significant role in GE2006, and it was pivotal in 
obliterating the monopoly held by the mainstream media over the provision of 
information. What the mainstream media failed to provide, the Internet did—in terms 
of citizens' reports, videos and photographs of rallies that were widely available 
despite the ban of such material. It is thus undeniable that blogs altered the dynamics 
of information distribution, if not revolutionising it. SG Rally: the Singapore 
Elections Rally Archive blog was one such blog that was able to fill in information 
gaps. The blog featured much footage from contributors that was unavailable from the 
mainstream press. Anyone who wished to view photos and videos from party rallies 
could simply do so with a few clicks of the mouse. Blogs such as Singapore Election 
Watch also featured online polls even though it was explicitly legislated that “no 
person [could] publish or permit or cause to be published the results of any election 
survey” during the election period.351 The blog did not hesitate to post PM Lee’s 
approval ratings online, and daringly published the results that more than half of those 
polled disapproved of him.352 The poll was interestingly contrasted with George W. 
Bush’s approval ratings that were placed right below. Elsewhere, the blog also 
featured polls of candidates in GRCs, displaying results that leaned in favour of the 
candidates from opposition parties. 
 Blogs have proved to be valuable sites of counter-hegemonic discourse and 
they have persistently and defiantly resisted regulations governing them. What is 
interesting is the range of possibilities of further resistance that can and will emerge 
when different technologies are combined. Tan Tarn How raises the example of SG 
                                                
351 Parliamentary Elections Act, Chapter 218, Section 78C. Available at <http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/> 
(30 April 2006). 
352 “Lee Hsien Loong rating hits rock bottom”, Singapore Election Watch, 3 May 2006, 
<http://singaporeelection.blogspot.com/2006_05_01_singaporeelection_archive.html> (10 May 2006). 
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Rally: the Singapore Elections Rally Archive blog set up by an anonymous person for 
the production of videos of election rallies available for online viewing. As Tan 
explains: 
The legality of doing so is made moot with identity hiding. Contributors who want 
safety in numbers can use  www.pledgebank.com to find pledgers for ‘I will send in 
my rally videos if 20 other people will join me.” tomorrow.sg can highlight the 
videos, and bloggers can e-mail them to the world at large.353  
 
 Grey areas of the law are exploited as a form of resistance: if podcasts and 
vodcasts are not on the positive list of electoral advertising, one can easily obtain 
them from YouTube and Google Video instead on blogs. Blogs examined earlier also 
provide many analytical articles and are widely perceived to be rather credible sources 
of information, especially Yawning Bread. Judging by the proliferating number of 
Singapore-based blogs, a new, Internet-savvy generation of voters seems to have 
reached a critical mass and apparently is less satisfied to sit back and remain mum 
about dissent, less eager to allow the PAP unbridled latitude to dictate and handle 
Singapore's affairs. 
 
Rational Cyberspace: an Oxymoron? 
The government routinely stereotypes the Internet as a “chaotic and disorganized” 
site, where “false story or rumour” once started, is “almost impossible to put … 
right”.354 Closer observation, however, shows this assumption to be not entirely true, 
                                                
353 Tan Tarn How, “Singapore’s Internet Comes of Age” Politics Online, 10 (8), (April 2006). 
Available at <http://www.politicsonline.com/netpulse/soundoff.asp?issue_id=10.08>. (30 April 2006). 
354 Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts, Press Releases “Email interview with Dr 
Lee Boon Yang, Minister for Information, Communication and the Arts with The Straits Times on 13 
April 2006. <http://www.mica.gov.sg/pressroom/press_0604173.htm> (accessed on 30 April 2006). 
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and as Xenoboy surmises, cyber surfers are also discerning individuals who do not 
merely input information without digesting.355  
For the MICA or IDA officers performing the study on Internet during GE 2006. 
Read this well since you drop by every day. There may be wild articles, irresponsible 
allegations during this period but the Net community itself regulates them simply by 
ignoring them. Because, the audience that surfs the Net for alternative viewpoints 
consists of discerning and not an agglomerate of naive individuals. Only the good 
articles, like the Yawning Bread series, get spread with speed across cyberspace. 
Only pictures which are withheld from mainstream media get hungrily devoured by 
cyberspace. The un-credible creates a stir and is quickly debunked by a community 
intelligent enough and well versed in cyberspace reflexes to detect it.356 
 
 Thus, it is evident that reason does reign in an allegedly “irrational 
cyberspace” that is supposedly filled with anonymous individuals and “non-truths”. 
Another demonstrative example of “rational” cyberspace can be gleaned from 
Singapore Election Watch’s accusations that Channel NewsAsia had deliberately 
edited the web pages before showing the screen shots on television, effectively 
censoring and thereby misrepresenting the blog’s content. Screen shots were then 
pasted on the blog as evidence of controversial headings that had to be “edited” out.357 
What followed showed a series of comments issued by readers, discussing the 
possibilities of what happened. An anonymous observer subsequently pointed out that 
a technical glitch was possible because the headings were not visible when he or she 
used a cached version of the URL from Google and the observer invited others to 
check if the same happened when using a certain version of the Internet browser, 
Internet Explorer. Subsequent postings became heated arguments, albeit with well-
substantiated technical evidence from both sides, accounting for what could have 
happened. This episode illustrated how readers could be discerning enough to search 
for the truth themselves instead of believing without question what others wrote. It 
                                                
355  “Threshold”, Xenoboysg, 14 May 2006, 
<http://xenoboysg.blogspot.com/2006_05_01_xenoboysg_archive.html> (16 May 2006). 
356  Ibid. 
357 The headings were “Lee Hsien Loong’s Territory Up for Grabs: Go Out Tonight, And Rule In 
Numbers!” and “Shady Company #1: GIC”. 
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also dispelled the idea of the Internet being a space for just for lies and untruths to 
spread. 
 
Offline vs. Online World 
The recent suspension of the regular column by Mr Brown in Today, following a 
chastisement from the government regarding his piece on the high cost of living in 
Singapore, is probably the most demonstrative of how the state views online and 
offline material articles differently. In his article, titled “Singaporeans are fed, up with 
progress”, Mr Brown commented that increases in taxi fares and electricity tariffs had 
come after the GE2006 and at a time when a government survey showed a widening 
income gap.358 In response, the press secretary to MICA, Ms K. Bhavani wrote a letter 
that was published the following weekday, where she said Mr Brown’s views 
“distort[ed] the truth” and offered no solutions.359 
If a columnist presents himself as a non-political observer, while exploiting his 
access to the mass media to undermine the Government’s standing with the 
electorate, then he is no longer a constructive critic, but a partisan player in 
politics.360 
 
In addition, she stated that his views were “polemics dressed up as analysis” and 
suggested that “instead of a diatribe, mrbrown should offer constructive criticism and 
alternatives”.361 Dr. Vivian Balakrishnan, Second Minister for MICA commented that 
the mainstream media had a responsibility to ensure certain standards in national 
debates, as such debates were not quite the same as discussions in Internet chatrooms. 
He stated that no one should, in the name of humour, “distort or aggravate on the 
                                                
358 Mr Brown, “S’poreans Are Fed, Up With Progress”, Today, 30 June 2006. 
359 K Bhavani, “Distorting The Truth, Mr Brown? When a Columnist Becomes a ‘Partisan Player’ in 
Politics”, Today, 3 July 2006. 
360 Ibid. This seems reminiscent of the “Catherine Lim affair” as discussed in chapter 2. 
361 Ibid. 
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emotional level”.362 MICA Minister Dr Lee Boon Yang also issued a statement 
defending the government’s position that it was merely exercising its right of reply to 
unfounded allegations which were “under the guise of humour”.363 He also made 
another interesting comment: 
If he had posted the same comment on his blog, we would treat it as part of Internet 
chatter, and we would have just let it be.364 
 
Thus, this statement seems to reflect that Lee is aware of the hidden message, but 
because it is published in a mainstream newspaper, the public transcript is trespassed 
upon. He added that as the Internet was often a “free-for-all” arena, certain critical 
and humourous elements were acceptable and it was not the government’s intention to 
chase after every posting on the Internet.365 
 Three points are thus apparent: firstly, that one is not allowed to comment on 
government policies without being labelled a “partisan player in politics”, and one is 
only allowed to speak if one has “constructive criticism”. Secondly, the government is 
drawing a clear line between the Internet and the mainstream media, by arguing that 
that the same rules do not apply to what is said online and offline—that is, what is 
tolerated online may not be tolerated offline (incidentally, this can also be ingeniously 
construed as license to exercise greater freedom of speech, if indeed “Internet chatter 
… would [be] just [left alone] as Dr. Lee claims). Thirdly, the government is aware of 
the level of threat that humour can pose, but realises that it cannot control humour 
itself as a communicative tool—on the one hand, the government, in acknowledging 
that cyberspace is difficult to control, seems to concede cyberspace as merely 
                                                
362 Lee U-Wen, “Mr Brown’s Recent Comments ‘Unjustified’”, Today, 13 July 2006. 
363 Ibid. 
364 Ibid. 
365 “Why Government Has to Respond to Mr Brown’s Comments”, AsiaOne, 12 July 2006. 
<http://www.asiaone.com/a1news/20060712_story6_1.html> (15 July 2006). 
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“internet chatter”, while on the other hand, attempting to undermine the humour as a 
strategy of resistance used in cyberspace. 
 The government, in knowing that it cannot physically control dissent in 
cyberspace, thus seems intent on launching a rhetorical campaign against the Internet 
as an alternative media. In various statements made in response to the satirical 
podcasts and Mr Brown’s article in the newspaper, activities on the Internet, such as 
blogging, are stereotyped by the authorities as mere “entertainment”. The routine 
stereotyping of the Internet as being “emotional” and a site of “humour” serves to 
delegitimise the Internet as a sphere of credible information, as compared to the 
mainstream media that is typically associated with “responsible”, “objective” and 
“rational” discourse. The very techniques of resistance on the Internet of anonymity, 
gossip, rumour and satire are routinely undermined and demeaned by state rhetoric 
with the frontier between the which is constituted as acceptable and not being a zone 
of constant struggle between the state and netizens—the state struggles to define and 
constitute what counts as the public transcript, but it also gives concession for the 
partially “hidden” transcript to be at play. While netizens insinuate almost routinely 
contempt for the dominant in cyberspace, taking advantage of anonymity, humour and 
gossip, implying that they are “grudging conscripts to the performance”, they also 








This study has attempted to employ the Gramscian lens in examining forms of netizen 
resistance by Singaporeans who are politically constrained. As scholars have largely 
focused on the issues of self-regulation, self-censorship and the use of the Internet by 
civil society in the Singapore context, this dissertation seeks to examine the scope for 
struggle and resistance on the Internet. By disaggregating cyberspace entities into 
alternative websites, discussion forums, and blogs, the study has examined various 
strategies of resistance employed during the months surrounding the election period. 
In spite of the panoptic nature of surveillance in cyberspace, netizens have succeeded 
in devising a range of stratagems for resistance—by exploiting loopholes in media 
regulations through employing humour, satire, parody, cloaks of anonymity, gossip 
and rumour; and by launching “rightful” resistance.  
 In this regard, Scott's theoretical framework supplements the Gramscian 
framework in examining specific strategies of resistance employed by the "weak" in 
Singapore. Specifically, they have exploited the use of cyberspace, a realm that is 
impossible to fully control, to constantly negotiate the subtle disciplining mechanisms 
of the state, drawing its arsenal various strategies of resistance: the veil of anonymity, 
gossip, rumour, the safe guise of humour in satire/parodies and "rightful resistance"; 
thereby offering counter-hegemonic readings, alternative discourses and dissenting 
opinions in various ways that circumvent existing laws and regulations. The cyber-
terrain is yet another site of resistance and struggle for hegemony, where the state 
tries to win the battleground by imposing regulatory structures to counter resistance 
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and where netizens resist and push the boundaries through their various strategies of 
resistance. 
As the introductory chapter has pointed out, this study of political resistance 
on Internet has a wider set of implications. Firstly, what seems like acquiescence on 
the public transcript, (i.e. the lack of demonstrations and strikes on the street or 
critical articles on newspapers) does not necessarily indicate socio-political apathy in 
Singapore, nor does it suggest that the citizens are subservient to existing hegemonic 
structures. The various strategies adopted by individuals on the Internet forces the 
state to respond differently in differing circumstances, treading a thin line to 
legitimise its rule. This highlights the delicate play of processes in the struggle for 
hegemony. Secondly, the “Singapore-model” of regulatory structures is not as solid as 
existing literature has implied. Strategies of resistance have been successfully 
practiced despite the heavy-hand of legislation and surveillance. Regimes seeking to 
emulate the Singaporean model will therefore benefit from examining the Singapore 
case. Finally, it is difficult to safely assume that the Internet is a “chaotic and 
irrational” domain without a regulatory structure of its own in correcting false 
information.  
 Although the state attempts to ensure “that its regulatory control over 
technology remains watertight”366 by instilling a panoptic and auto-regulatory 
environment in Singapore, the element of fear does not seem to be as resilient as some 
scholars proposed. Netizens seem to be emboldened by various strategies that take 
advantage of loopholes in the system, taking advantage of the “light-touch” self-
regulatory approach of the authorities. Although the closure of Sintercom, the 
                                                
366 Lee, “Internet Control”, 92. 
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gazetting of TC as a political society by authorities, as well as the criminal 
investigation of Zulfikar and Ho, seem to have locked the doors of opportunity for the 
use of the Internet as a tool for voicing alternative opinion, this dissertation argues 
that a closer examination of cyberspace entities suggests the opposite—that the 
Internet community is more resilient than perceived. Contrary to what Tan Tarn How 
suggests, the Internet community has not been “spooked”367 by these events, with 
Sintercom being reborn as the New Sintercom, remaining active throughout the 
election campaign, and with TC continuing to operate with  relative degrees of 
freedom despite intentional clamping of activities during that same week. Apart from 
the arrests of a few bloggers under the Sedition Act for posting racist remarks on the 
Internet in 2005, no other individuals have come under investigation for online posts 
since. 
It is also noteworthy to refrain from generalising the “Internet” as a monolithic 
whole, for further analysis shows that there exists variance amongst forums, blogs and 
other websites. In comparing interactive sites such as blogs and forums, one can 
observe that firstly, unlike blogs, forums typically allow anyone to start a new 
discussion, otherwise known as a thread, or to reply to an existing thread. Secondly, 
the range of topics discussed in forums is usually wider, as a website running forum 
software generally has more than one forum, each dedicated to a different topic. 
Thirdly, while many blogs allow visitors to post comments in reply to authors, the 
number of people creating entries tends to be quite limited, with the range of 
viewpoints being correspondingly narrow given that readers typically post comments 
without aiming to engage in a debate with the blogger. This differs from discussions 
                                                
367 Tan Tarn How, “Probe into Web Articles Spooks Net Community”, The Straits Times Interactive, 6 
July 2002.  
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forums, where issues are debated more comprehensively, with diversity of opinions 
being generated. Fourthly, blogs in question are also observed to host more analytical 
articles as compared to the online forums examined; that the comments on blogs tend 
to more “civil” in nature whereas debates in online forums can degenerate into name-
calling catfights laced with offensive language. Finally, the modes of resistance also 
differ, with satirical and sarcastic comments on blogs, but more informal, direct 
language and more personal attacks in forums. This disparity might most likely be due 
to issues of accountability, for there are more recognisable personalities that host or 
partake in these popular blogs.  
The cloak of anonymity seems to be an obvious reason why netizens are 
confident to post remarks online without fear of legal repercussions. With the setting 
up of anonymous blogs, by using overseas proxies as well as by exploiting 
technological advances in Youtube and Google Video as media hosting sites, many on 
online forums and blogs have flouted existing regulations during the GE2006 
campaign week. The authorities have also realised that it is impossible to fully control 
these areas: 
We also accept that Internet and new media are evolving. In five years' time, with 
new technologies and services, even more people will be Net-savvy. So our policies 
must also evolve. We will review our policies on the Internet and new media during 
the election period bearing in mind the changes taking place. We will consider how 
to better embrace these changes so that by the next GE, we may be able to adopt a 
lighter-touch approach during the election period.368 
 
 Anonymity of individual identities can be a double-edged sword, however, for 
though it can function as a shield or mechanism for damage control, people do tend to 
trust anonymous comments less. This is evident in some threads in online forums 
where readers question the sources of particular information. Nonetheless, the same 
                                                
368 Opening speech by MICA Minister Lee Boon Yang at the conference organised by the Public 
Relations Academy, quoted from Leslie Koh, “Blogs and Podcasts May Get More Leeway At Next 
GE”, The Straits Times, 1 June 2006. 
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does not apply to anonymous blogs such as Xenoboy and Molly Meek because they 
function less as information providers than analytical arenas. It is also observed in 
Chapter Five that the Internet is not as chaotic, irrational and frivolous as assumed by 
many, for false information or weak arguments are quickly corrected by other net 
users. The assumption that readers are passive consumers of information therefore 
needs to be dispelled. As Stuart Hall highlights, the readings of texts can be 
“dominant-hegemonic”, “negotiated” or “oppositional”,369 with the processes of 
discursive translation and decoding differing from reader to reader.  
 Another key observation of this study is that the network of online forums, 
blogs and other websites is very vast. As explicated in Chapters Three to Five, these 
cyberspace entities promote each other by way of linkages, forming an intricate 
network of cyberspace entities. On online forums, members recommend posts and 
articles from other forums and blogs. Likewise in the blogs studied, there exists many 
links to other blogs by way of tags and URL linkages to other websites. Some blogs 
also highlight discussions in certain forums, further elucidating the vast extensiveness 
of cyberspace networks, and the visible salience of loose “online communities” that 
are united in certain fronts: in opposing biased media framing, perceived unreasonable 
policies and hegemonic discourse in general. 
  Thus, it will be interesting to observe how the state continues in its attempt to 
win consent, whilst endeavouring to suppress the emergence of an increasingly 
politicised Internet community. MICA’s intention to review the way it manages new 
media, and its aim to adopt a “lighter touch approach” at the next polls, seems to be a 
step in the right direction. Indeed, the impact of blogging and online forums in 
                                                
369 Stuart Hall, “Encoding/Decoding” in Culture, Media, Language, ed. Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, 
Andrew Lowe and Paul Willis (London: Hutchinson, 1980).
 120 
GE2006 has demonstrated that swift developments in technology have shifted the 
balance of power in the political landscape. Online discourse cannot be effectively 
eliminated due to technological opportunities present in overseas and anonymous 
proxies, and the implementation of harsher policies would be likely to incur the wrath 
of increasing numbers of techno-savvy Singaporeans seeking new outlets for political 
expression and resistance. Even if a “lighter touch approach” is to be implemented in 
the next election, and if the populace were to rise to the occasion by using the Internet 
as a space for free speech, it would be giving too much credit to authorities to 
presume that netizens would move into spaces intentionally ceded by the former. It 
would be more accurate to envisage a space for resistance on its own, for by the next 
elections, newer developments in technology would have empowered netizens further, 
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